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Abstract
Secure Configuration and Management of Linux Systems using a Network
Service Orchestrator
Vijay Satti
Manual management of the configuration of network devices and computing devices
(hosts) is an error-prone task. Centralized automation of these tasks can lower the costs
of management, but can also introduce unknown or unanticipated security risks. Miscon-
figuration (deliberate (by outsiders) or inadvertent (by insiders)) can expose a system to
significant risks.
Centralized network management has seen significant progress in recent years, result-
ing in model-driven approaches that are clearly superior to previous "craft" methods. Host
management has seen less development. The tools available have developed in separate
task-specific ways.
This thesis explores two aspects of the configuration management problem for hosts:
(1) implementing host management using the model-driven (network) management tools;
(2) establishing the relative security of traditional methods and the above proposal for
model-driven host management.
It is shown that the model-driven approach is feasible, and the security of the model-
driven approach is significantly higher than that of existing approaches.
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Computer networks are the backbone of an enterprise’s Information Technology (IT)
infrastructure. The size of these networks varies from a small number of devices residing
at a room in the head-office to hundreds and thousands of devices spread across the entire
globe. These networks are dynamic and have different operational needs and network
management requirements. Network management is simple when the number of devices
is small. However, it becomes increasingly complex as the device count goes up.
A survey conducted by Sherry, Hasan, Scott, Krishnamurthy, Ratnasamy, and Sekar
(2012) on 57 enterprise networks of small to very large sizes and ranging from approxi-
mately a few hundred to 100,000 devices found that these networks comprised of a broad
spectrum of a heterogeneous set of devices called as middleboxes. It was also found that
even small networks incur substantial management and hardware expenses with the man-
agement team personnel requirement going up to hundreds in larger enterprises. Further-
more, a large number of enterprise network administrators reported misconfiguration as
the primary cause of network failures (Sherry et al., 2012).
The survey shows the trends that due to the broad category of network devices and
the dynamic nature of networks, network complexity increases substantially. Thus, an
efficient and systematic configuration and management of the network continues to be a
challenging task for network administrators.
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Configuration and management of today’s IT infrastructure can be predominantly clas-
sified into two categories; network management and host management. Although there
has been much study and effort invested in both fields individually, however so far only
little study has been done that focuses on the management of host devices using the net-
work configuration protocol NETCONF and its data modeling language YANG (Yet An-
other Next Generation).
This study contributes to the literature focusing on future work regarding network
management based on the requirements put forward by the network engineers in a work-
shop held by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) in 2002. The requirements are stated in
the Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) informational document RFC3535 and are still
very relevant today. A key requirement put forward was that transactions are an essential
mechanism and it could significantly simplify the process of configuration and manage-
ment across a large number of devices (Schoenwaelder, 2003).
Furthermore, while investigating the problems and challenges faced by network engi-
neers of large enterprises, it was found that a transactional-oriented network management
protocol such as NETCONF could potentially address and solve these problems. On the
contrary, other host configuration management tools lack transactions and employ scripts
with the configurations laid out in sequential order. Hence, this study is motivated by the
apparent lack of research and discussion on the real-world use of NETCONF and YANG
for the management of host systems and attempts to examine the feasibility and security
that would result from the use.
The security of a system is mainly affected by two components; internal factors and
external factors. For an enterprise, internal security is a major concern. The insiders or
the employees have access to sensitive data and can intentionally or unintentionally leak
the information. Inadvertently, a security loophole could also be exposed as a result of a
misconfiguration by an employee. On the contrary, an outsider intentionally tries to break
the outer defenses first before they can gain access to the internal network. It is, therefore,
imperative to do a comparative in-depth threat analysis to identify the potential threats
that could arise by using NETCONF and YANG for host management.
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In brief, the thesis explores the NETCONF-YANG based configuration and manage-
ment of Linux-based host systems using a Network Service Orchestrator (NSO) by em-
ploying the Open Systems Interconnection’s (OSI) network management model. The In-
ternational Organization for Standardization (ISO) has standardized the network manage-
ment model called FCAPS, an acronym for Fault Management, Configuration Manage-
ment, Accounting Management, Performance Management, and Security Management
(ISO, 1989). The focus of this study is primarily on configuration management and se-
curity management aspects.
Structure and organization of the thesis:
• Chapter 2, Background Study, covers the history, the background, and the litera-
ture of the several concepts that establish the foundation for a reader to understand
the terminologies used in this thesis. The respective subsections cover only those
protocols, tools, and concepts that are relevant for this study.
• Chapter 3, Problem Statement, defines and describes the network configuration and
management problems addressed in this thesis.
• Chapter 4, Proposed Solution, describes the proposed solution that addresses the
problem identified in the problem statement chapter.
• Chapter 5, Threat Models, illustrates the threat models and covers the security anal-
ysis related to the two different configuration management approaches for host man-
agement discussed in this thesis.
• Chapter 6, Conclusion and Future Work, summarizes the thesis and introduces pos-
sible opportunities for future research.
• Appendix, comprises the lab arrangement and includes the device configurations




Networks vary in size, ranging from small home networks to enterprise Intranet (LAN)
to wide area networks (WAN). Smaller networks are easily manageable and can often be
configured manually. However, as the network grows in size, it is self-evident that a net-
work management solution is required. Network management is a process that can be
modeled using the OSI/ISO FCAPS framework. The framework can be split into five
discrete areas, viz. Fault Management, Configuration Management, Accounting Manage-
ment, Performance Management, and Security Management (ISO, 1989). This chapter em-
phasizes on the configuration management and security management aspects of network
management.
Configuration management is the management of change in the state of a network-
element using a tool that enforces and ensures the change in the state. A network-element
can be any network device or host in a network management framework that performs a
specific functionality.
Security management is making sure who can make changes and view configuration
information of the network-elements. There are various dimensions to characterize the
security of a system, the most important being Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (also
knows as CIA triad (Perrin, 2008)), Authentication, Authorization, and Non-repudiation.
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2.1 Network Management
In the late 1980s, the Internet was developing fast. With the growing number of net-
work devices, such as routers, switches, and servers, it became increasingly challenging to
manage all these devices and make sure they were performing optimally. The number of
vendors was growing larger, and each was having its own set of management mechanisms.
A network administrator was expected to learn all the proprietary management systems.
This lead to severe management problems because of a lack of an accepted standard for
the management of the network devices. It was at this point that it became apparent to the
Internet community that a standard management protocol had to be developed.
In October 1987, an experimental management approach appeared called high-level
entity management system (HEMS) and high-level entity management protocol (HEMP),
stated in RFC1021 and RFC1022 respectively (Partridge & Trewitt, 1987b) (Partridge &
Trewitt, 1987a). After a few weeks, another protocol was proposed called simple gateway
monitoring protocol (SGMP), stated in RFC1028 (Davin, Case, Fedor, & Schoffstall, 1987).
Work was also done on a third proposal called common management information services
and protocol over TCP/IP (CMOT), which appeared in April 1989 and is stated in RFC1095
(Warrier & Besaw, 1989). As reported in RFC1052, the IAB expressed its gratitude for
the efforts of the three working groups and directed IETF to coordinate on the on-going
developments. It was later decided to drop the development of HEMS/HEMP on favor of
the CMOT and SGMP group. It was also concluded that the Internet community should
start to adopt simple network management protocol (SNMP, successor of SGMP) as the
common protocol for network management (Cerf, 1989).
Furthermore, the OSI/ISO splits network management into five distinct areas. The
configuration management part of the model for network-elements can be performed us-
ing several methods such as configuration files, command line interface (CLI), web-based
graphical user interface (Web UI), simple network management protocol (SNMP), and net-
work configuration protocol (NETCONF). Configuration files usually employ a domain
specific language (DSL), which consists of configuration data in various formats, such as
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Ruby, JavaScript object notation (JSON), INI files, or custom syntaxes. The subsequent
sections explore the characteristics of CLI, SNMP, and NETCONF protocol.
2.1.1 CLI for Network Devices
Most network devices use a CLI as the default network management interface. It is
a text-based interface that is used for reading and writing the configurations to and from
the device. The interface is usually implemented using a command line shell that converts
input commands into device specific functions. User entered input commands are trans-
ferred to a configuration file and then reloaded to the device if required. Configurations
are written using the device’s internal logic or in-built application programming interface
(API).
A CLI can be accessed using a console, Telnet, or a secure shell (SSH) connection. A
console is a physical port available on a network device that is used to connect directly
to the device as essentially there is no display on a network device. Whereas, Telnet and
SSH are the protocols that are used connect remotely to a device. A CLI connection is
established using a terminal emulator application such as PuTTy and SecureCRT. Figure
2.1 shows a CLI session using a terminal emulator on a Cisco router.
CSR1000v#show i p i n t e r f a c e b r i e f
I n t e r f a c e IP−Address OK? Method S t a t u s Protoco l
Gigabi tEthernet1 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 2 2 . 4 1 YES DHCP up up
Gigabi tEthernet2 unassigned YES unset a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y down down
Gigabi tEthernet3 unassigned YES unset a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y down down
Figure 2.1: CLI session on a Cisco router
2.1.2 SNMP
Simple network management protocol (SNMP) was introduced in 1988 and was ac-
cepted as a full Internet standard in May 1990. The protocol allows a network administra-
tor to configure SNMP-based devices and enables the monitoring of the device state. For
example, it can be used to restart a router or to check the speed of an interface on a switch.
It not only supports routers and switches, but can also be used to manage and monitor any
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device that support SNMP operations, e.g., Unix-based systems, Windows-based systems,
printers, firewalls, and more. All messages are transported via user datagram protocol
(UDP) over commonly used port 161 and 162. The protocol is simple, easy to implement,
and widely adopted. Despite that, it has many shortcomings because of which consistent
efforts have been made for the continuous development and support of the protocol.
SNMPv1 was the initial release of the protocol, defined and published by the IETF in
RFC1157 (Case, Fedor, Schoffstall, & Davin, 1990). The security of the protocol is based
on community strings, which is merely a plain-text string that allows any SNMP based
applications to gain access to the device’s management information by just entering the
string. The security of the messages sent through the protocol thus depends on the security
of the internal network of the enterprise. Due to the shortcomings such as weak security
and relatively poor performance when a large amount of management data needs to be
retrieved, two work groups were established, one to focus on security, and the other to
focus on the performance (this group was called SMP). These two groups later merged
and formed SNMPv2.
SNMPv2, also known as SNMPv2c, is defined in RFC 1901, 1905, 1906 (Case, Mc-
Cloghrie, Rose, & Waldbusser, 1995) (Case, McCloghrie, Rose, & Waldbusser, 1996) (Case,
McCloghrie, & Rose, 1996). This version has better management features but borrows the
security from SNMPv1 in which community strings are in plain-text and pre-shared with
the communicating parties. An eavesdropper can easily capture community strings be-
cause all the data is unencrypted. The failure of the working group to deliver the security
as per the agreement slowed down the overall acceptance of SNMPv2. SNMPv3 later re-
placed this protocol.
SNMPv3 is the latest version of the SNMP protocol, defined in RFC 2571 to 2575. The
main reason for the development of this version was to add cryptographic security and
enhanced support for remote configurations (Stallings, 1998). It added implementation
support for following three security levels:
• NoAuthNoPriv: Communication without authentication and without privacy.
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• AuthNoPriv: Communication with authentication but without privacy. Authentica-
tion is based on either HMAC_MD5 or HMAC_SHA algorithm.
• AuthPriv: Communication with authentication and with privacy. Authentication
is based on either HMAC_MD5 or HMAC_SHA algorithm. Privacy is based on
CBC_DES algorithm.
SNMP works in a client-server mode. A client, also know as SNMP manager, has
a network management station (NMS) application installed and running and is used to
manage the SNMP managed devices. A server, also known as SNMP agent, is a managed
device having a management agent application installed and running. SNMPv3 re-named
the SNMP agents as client entities.
When an SNMP server encounters an issue, it sends a message to the client known as
SNMP trap. Trap messages are special code with a unique ID called object identifier data
(OID). The management capabilities of SNMP are represented in a file called management
information base (MIB). MIBs are used to expose an agent’s management data to the man-
ager. The translation of an OID is actually stored in MIBs. SNMP manager understands
the alerts and sends the configuration data by translating the MIBs exposed by the agent.
However, SNMP is mostly used for alerts and not for configuration management because
of a lack of standardized MIBs (Schoenwaelder, 2003).
2.1.3 NETCONF
In June 2002, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a workshop on network man-
agement. The notes from the workshop are documented in RFC3535 (Schoenwaelder,
2003). This RFC states that:
The goal of the workshop was to continue the important dialog started between
network operators and protocol developers, and to guide the IETFs focus on
future work regarding network management.
Based on the requirements put forward by network operators, it was concluded that
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simple network management protocol (SNMP) is not adequate for configuration manage-
ment and a newer protocol was required that would address the issues raised in the work-
shop. Complying to the stated requirements, the network configuration protocol (NET-
CONF) was published in 2006 in RFC4741 (Enns, 2006). The protocol has gained accep-
tance since its launch. The original RFC4741 was updated and replaced with RFC6241 in
2011 (Enns, Bjorklund, Schoenwaelder, & Bierman, 2011).
NETCONF, as it stands for, network configuration protocol, is an IETF standardized
network configuration and management protocol. It provides a method to add, modify,
and delete the configuration of network devices. It is a client-server based protocol. A
client is typically a NETCONF manager, and a server is a device that supports NETCONF
operations.
It is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) Remote Procedure Call (RPC) style pro-
tocol. XML is used to transport data while RPC is a request from one computer program
to another program. All the content transported through RPC requests and responses is
sent through XML, encoded in UTF-8. The communicating parties use rpc and rpc-reply
elements for requests and responses. Each rpc and rpc-reply element has a message ID
number and a namespace (e.g., urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0).
A NETCONF connection provides confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. Mes-
sages sent through NETCONF are connection oriented. Connections are encrypted, and
messages are transported over the SSH protocol. The default transmission control protocol
(TCP) port assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) for NETCONF
over SSH is 830. Some RFCs define NETCONF over transport layer security (TLS), simple
object access protocol (SOAP), and blocks extensible exchange protocol (BEEP), but they
are infrequently used.
It is a transactional protocol. When a configuration change requires updates across
multiple devices, changes happen all-or-nothing and all-at-once. That means, changes all
succeed or all fail. Transactions are essential to avoid unknown, inconsistent, in-determinant
configuration state of the devices. For example, a virtual private network (VPN) update




























Figure 2.2: NETCONF datastores
lead to unexpected behavior in the network. A NETCONF operation applies configura-
tion locks on all target devices. Locks are released once all the configuration changes are
successfully implemented or discarded.
A typical NETCONF system includes one-or-more type of datastores. Data stored in
the database can be conceptually categorized into configuration data and state data. Con-
figuration data is the writeable device configuration, and state data is the device state
information. Figure 2.2 represents these datastores with the base operations that can be
performed on them. Candidate datastore holds the copy of data that has not yet been
uploaded to the device. All the configurations are first pushed into candidate datastore,
where they are validated and then activated by performing a commit onto running datas-
tore. Running datastore holds the current active configuration on a device. Startup data-
store represents the configuration used by the device at startup. Depending on the capa-
bilities, candidate and startup may or may not be supported by the NETCONF manager,
whereas, running is a mandatory datastore.
When a NETCONF manager connects to a NETCONF device, they exchange "hello"
messages as shown in Figure 2.3. The "hello" message indicates the capabilities supported
by each side. These capabilities include information such as the NETCONF version that
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<?xml vers ion=" 1 . 0 " encoding="UTF−8" ?>
< h e l l o xmlns=" urn : i e t f : params : xml : ns : netconf : base : 1 . 0 ">
< c a p a b i l i t i e s >
< c a p a b i l i t y >urn : i e t f : params : netconf : base :1 .0 </ c a p a b i l i t y >
</ c a p a b i l i t i e s >
</hel lo >
] ] >] ] >
Figure 2.3: Example of a NETCONF "hello" operation
the client and server supports and the YANG data models advertised by the device.
NETCONF exists in version 1.0 and version 1.1. These two versions use different fram-
ing mechanisms. In version 1.0, a special character sequence ]]>]]> is added at the end
of each XML message to indicate a break between XML packets. Whereas, version 1.1 has
a run-length encoding. Also, there are a number of tags and attributes that can be used
within a specific operation. A list of all these tags and attributes can be found in RFC6241
(Enns et al., 2011).
NETCONF Base Operations:
• get: This operation is used to retrieve both configuration and state data of the device.
If the operation succeeds, NETCONF server sends an rpc-reply message. If it fails,
an rpc-error message is included in the rpc-reply.
• get-config: This operation is used to retrieve configuration data only. Additional
tags such as "filter" can also be used within get-config for sub-tree filtering to retrieve
information based on a specific data model of that device.
• edit-config: This operation is used to make changes to the configuration of a de-
vice. To perform this operation, the target datastore needs to be specified in the rpc
request.
• copy-config: This operation is used to copy or replace configuration data between
different datastores, and to specified URLS. It uses "source" and "target" tags to spec-
ify the source and target datastore.
• delete-config: This operation is used to remove configurations from a specified
11
datastore.
• lock: This operation is used to lock the datastores. It is used to ensure the consis-
tency of the device configuration so that another client would not be able to make
any changes while a client session is already active.
• unlock: This operation is used to release an active "lock". Requirement for perform-
ing this operation is that the requested "lock" should be currently active, and should
be issued by the same session as "unlock".
• close-session: This operation is used to gracefully close a session. All the acquired
"locks" and resources are released before the session is terminated by the server.
• kill-session: This operation is used to forcefully close a session using its session ID.
A couple of new operations are added and described in RFC6241, e.g., "commit" op-
eration to copy the device configuration from candidate datastore to running datastore,
"discard-changes" operation to roll-back candidate datastore configuration to the active
running configuration, "cancel-commit" operation to cancel an active confirm commit op-
eration, "validate" operation to validate the configurations stored in candidate datastore.
These operations can only be used when candidate datastore is enabled (Enns et al., 2011).
2.1.4 YANG
Yet Another Next Generation (YANG) is a data modeling language designed for use
with the network configuration protocol (NETCONF). In simple terms, it is the grammar
and vocabulary of each device that is managed using the NETCONF protocol. It was pro-
posed in 2010 in RFC6020 (Bjorklund, 2010) and updated in 2016 to RFC7950 (Bjorklund,
2016).
When NETCONF was launched in 2006, there was no standardized data modeling
language available to define the data carried over the protocol. Standardization of YANG
was established on the basis of the work done by an IETF group called NETMOD. The
IETF released version 1.0 of YANG in 2010, and subsequently released version 1.1 in 2016.
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YANG is a data modeling language used to define the syntax and semantics of the data
sent over the NETCONF protocol. In other terms, it is used to model the configuration
and state data in NETCONF as the data in YANG maps one-to-one to XML. To understand
how it is used in a network management system, consider a scenario where a management
tool has to connect to different vendor equipments. Each vendor has its own proprietary
command-line interface (CLI) and application programming interface (APIs). Making a
change, like adding a device or adding a new service would require a change at multiples
levels as the new device might talk to other devices, or the corresponding new service
may incorporate multiple devices. A YANG data modeling was developed to make this
approach more efficient as it permits vendors to use a common language to define the data
models for their devices. So, next time a new device is added, it might have different data
models as compared to devices from other vendors, but YANG; the data models governing
language is the same.
YANG data is stored in files called modules. A module for a device can be published by
the IETF, the OpenConfig, or the device Vendors. An example YANG module (Figure 2.4)
(Bjorklund, 2016) and the breakdown of important module statements with their meaning
is listed below:
• module: Each module starts with a module statement and the module name. A
module name should be same as the name of the file.
• namespace: It is a unique identifier used to distinguish a module from other YANG
modules. A typical NETCONF based system can have multiple modules from vari-
ous devices and different data model publishers.
• prefix: This statement is used to assign a prefix, which is used to refer to a module
namespace.
• import: This statement is used to refer to data from other modules, and an include
statement refers to data from submodules into a main module.
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module example {
namespace " . . . " ;
p r e f i x " . . . " ;
import . . . { . . . }
inc lude " . . . " ;
o rganiza t ion " . . . " ;
c o n t a c t " . . . " ;
d e s c r i p t i o n
" . . . " ;
r e v i s i o n . . . {
d e s c r i p t i o n " . . . " ;
}
typedef . . . {
. . .
}
c on ta in er . . . {
l e a f . . . {
. . .
}
l e a f− l i s t . . . {
. . .
}
co nt a i ne r . . . {
l e a f . . . {
. . .
}
l i s t . . . {
key . . .
l e a f . . . {
. . .
}
l e a f . . . {
. . .
}







Figure 2.4: Representation of an example YANG module
• organization, contact, description: These statements describe the information spe-
cific to the party that owns the module.
• revision: This statement describes the history related to the changes of the module.
• typedef: A data type may be a base type or derived type. All the base types are
listed in the RFC6020. A derived data type is a user specified data type structure.
typedef statement is used to define a derived type named my-base-str-type. It has a
base type as string, and can take a string of length 1 to 255. A leaf named class uses
this derived data type.
• container: This statement is used for organizing a tree. It groups leaf, leaf-list, and
list. It does not hold any data and does not have a data type. Containers can be
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Figure 2.5: pyang tree format translation of a YANG module
nested. In Figure 2.5, a login container is nested inside a system container.
• leaf: A leaf is like a variable that holds a single data value of a specified data type.
In Figure 2.5, leaf host-name has a data type assigned as string. Additional attributes
can be defined within a leaf, e.g., "mandatory true;" defines that the configuration
must be present, "config true;" states that it is the configuration data whereas, "config
false;" means that it is the state data.
• leaf-list: A leaf-list is like an array that can hold values of a specified data type.
Unlike leaf, it can hold multiple data values.
• list: A list is like a table of variables. It has a "key" statement, which defines the
entries that are key values.
A network programmer uses the YANG modules published by either the vendor, the
IETF, or the OpenConfig based models to describe the configuration hierarchy for a device
or service in the network. These YANG models are then encoded in XML and transferred
to the server using NETCONF or any other API (such as RESTCONF, or gRPC). Figure 2.5
shows a tree format translation for a YANG module. A YANG module can also be trans-
lated into an XML-based syntax called YIN using the yin filter in the "pyang" python-based
YANG validator tool. YIN format output simplifies the task of a developer to validate, ap-
ply data filters and perform other operations on the YANG modules.
15
2.2 Host Management
Host management, interchangeably known as configuration management, is the man-
agement of a change in the state of a system throughout its lifecycle. Depending on the
operating system (OS), a system can be classified as Linux-based or Windows-based. Con-
figuration management started as a process within the US military in the late 1960s to
manage the lifecycle of the various changes in the system. The process has evolved since
then and has been adopted for building a system or software quickly and efficiently.
Until recently, configuring IT infrastructure was a manual task. As IT infrastructure
has multiplied, technologies to manage these infrastructures have evolved as well. The
growing understanding of IT and infrastructure as a code has influenced the work on
configuration management processes. The best practices for configuration management
can be found under the "Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) Asset and
Configuration Management" Service Transition processes (BMC, n.d.).
Configuration management has many applications, e.g., infrastructure migration, mass
deployment, configuration change failure rollbacks, and more. Consider a university IT
infrastructure, which typically has hundreds and thousands of desktops running on Linux
and Windows-based systems. A system administrator needs to deploy a security patch on
these systems. If done manually, he or she has to log in into each machine and then install
the patch. This process is time-consuming and prone to human errors. A configuration
management tool can do the mass deployment by simply entering a command on a master
system that pushes the patch installation request to all the connected client machines. This
automated process not only saves time but is also less susceptible to human errors.
2.2.1 CLI for Host Systems
Despite advances in host management technologies, there are still many network-elements
in a network that offer CLI as the default configuration management interface. Modern
configuration management protocols provide connectivity through a secure remote con-
nection protocol such as SSH over TCP or through other transport mechanisms. On the
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vijay@Hartmanis :~ $ i f c o n f i g eno1
eno1 Link encap : Ethernet HWaddr ∗∗:∗∗:∗∗:∗∗:∗∗:∗∗
i n e t addr : 1 3 2 . 2 0 5 . 9 . 6 2 Bcast : 1 3 2 . 2 0 5 . 9 . 6 3 Mask : 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 2 5 2
i n e t 6 addr : fe80 : : 2 e27 : d7 f f : fe46 : c8b9 /64 Scope : Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric : 1
RX packets :1715924 e r r o r s : 0 dropped : 0 overruns : 0 frame : 0
TX packets :1150153 e r r o r s : 0 dropped : 0 overruns : 0 c a r r i e r : 0
c o l l i s i o n s : 0 txqueuelen :1000
RX bytes :1454882551 ( 1 . 4 GB) TX bytes :126440310 ( 1 2 6 . 4 MB)
I n t e r r u p t : 2 0 Memory : fb000000−fb020000
Figure 2.6: Network adapter information on a Linux-based system
C:\ Users\Vi jay S a t t i >netsh i n t e r f a c e ip show addresses "Wi−f i "
Configurat ion f o r i n t e r f a c e "Wi−Fi "
DHCP enabled : Yes
IP Address : 1 7 2 . 3 0 . 1 1 4 . 8
Subnet P r e f i x : 1 7 2 . 3 0 . 0 . 0 / 1 7 ( mask 2 5 5 . 2 5 5 . 1 2 8 . 0 )
Defaul t Gateway : 1 7 2 . 3 0 . 0 . 1
Gateway Metric : 0
I n t e r f a c e M e t r i c : 35
Figure 2.7: Network adapter information on a Windows-based system
other hand, many vendors still offer CLI as the only way to connect to a network-element
using an unsecured unreliable connection.
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 shows the output of command to retrieve the IP address
of a network interface controller (NIC) on a Linux-based and a Windows-based system
respectively. Even though the purpose is same, the syntax of the command and the output
format is different for different systems.
Configuring a heterogeneous network through different CLIs could be an inefficient
task, but CLI is still handy in scenarios when simple network management protocol (SNMP)
or network configuration protocol (NETCONF) connectivity is unavailable over the net-
work, or when the network speed is low. For example, a denial-of-service (DoS) attack
may hinder the remote connectivity to a device. In situations like this, direct access to
device CLI through the serial link could admittedly be helpful (Jones, 2004).
2.2.2 Configuration Management Tools
There are many open-source and commercial configuration management tools avail-
able in the market. Choosing the correct tool for an enterprise involves many factors (De-
laet, Joosen, & Van Brabant, 2010). Below is a brief overview of the most popular configu-
ration management tools:
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Puppet is an open-source tool, initially released in 2005, and has a client-server archi-
tecture. Puppet server runs on one or more servers, and puppet clients runs as an agent
on each client machine that an administrator wants to manage. The tool can be used to
manage a variety of Linux, Unix, and Windows-based systems. The configurations are
defined in a file called Puppet manifests. Enterprise version of Puppet provides GUI, CLI,
and API support for client management. The tool is written in C++ and Clojure. All the
system related data are written in a custom declarative language or Ruby domain specific
language (DSL).
Chef is an open-source tool, initially released in January 2009, and has a client-server
architecture. Chef server runs on the master machine, and chef clients run as agents on
each client machine. The tool can be used to manage Linux, Unix. and Windows-based
systems. It uses SSH to connect and certificates to authenticate communication with the
clients. All the configurations are stored in a machine called workstation, usually a master
server, where it is tested and then sent to the clients. These configurations are defined in a
file called recipes (grouped as cookbooks). Once the cookbooks are uploaded to the server,
an administrator can access Web UI, CLI, or API to send the configurations to the clients.
The tool itself is written in Ruby and Erlang and uses Ruby DSL for writing the recipes.
Salt (also known as Saltstack) is an open-source tool, initially released in March 2011,
and has a client-server architecture. The server machine is called as master, and clients are
called minions. Master runs remote execution commands to send the configuration data
to minions. It is a CLI based tool written in Python language and can be used to manage
Linux/Unix and Windows-based systems. Saltstack is fast and reliable as it uses Zeromq
library for message transport. Client-related configurations are executed through Salt files,
which are defined in Yet Another Markup Language (YAML).
Ansible is an open-source configuration management and orchestration tool, initially
released in February 2012, and later acquired by Red Hat in 2015. Unlike Puppet, Chef and
Salt, it has an agent-less architecture, which means client machines need not have an agent
or a daemon installed to connect to the server. The tool can be used to manage Linux/Unix
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and Windows-based systems. Ansible server uses a secure SSH or remote PowerShell con-
nection to push configurations to the client machines. All the configurations are defined
in files called Playbooks. Besides, it also comes with built-in modules to perform various
operations. Modules can be directly executed on client machines or can be used in play-
books. The tool is primarily accessed using CLI. The enterprise version comes with Web
UI solution called Ansible Tower. The tool is built on Python language and uses YAML
for writing the playbooks. Custom modules can be written in a scripting language such as
Python, Ruby, Perl, and Bash (Ansible, n.d.).
2.3 Network Service Orchestration
Network service orchestration (NSO) in computer networking is defined as the provi-
sioning of network services by automating the network-elements for end-to-end service
lifecycle management. An orchestrator tool keeps a high level track of the service work-
flows, from allocating resources, to scaling resource, to deploying resources, thus sim-
plifying the process of end-to-end network service creation. The network device that is
automated can typically be a router, switch, gateway, firewall, and more, and service typi-
cally includes configuring virtual private network (VPN), virtual LAN (VLANs), subnets,
routing, trunks, quality of service (QoS), etc. A network device can be physical or virtual
and can span across LAN, WAN or a remote data center.
While configuration management tools (such as Puppet, Chef, Saltstack, Ansible, dis-
cussed in Subsection 2.2.2) are ideally suited for host system configuration such as Linux,
Unix, and Windows-based systems, network service orchestration tools are primarily used
for network configuration and end-to-end service lifecycle management of network de-
vices. Some configuration management tools also support network configuration man-
agement, however comparatively it is not as efficient. Configuration management tools
require building a network from ground zero which includes building manifests, cook-
books, or playbooks whereas, NSO uses the concept of abstraction for representing the
device configurations.
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Consider a scenario in which a network engineer wants to create a VLAN in a network.
Using the traditional approach would require to log into each device and to enter the com-
mands using its command line interface (CLI) or application programming interface (API)
to configure the VLAN. NSO, on the other hand, can automatically discover the current
configurations on the devices across the entire network and present the network engineer
the network topology and all dependencies for creating the VLAN. He or she can then
instruct NSO to apply the configurations on multiple devices without resorting to manual
login into each device or without modifying scripts that call the device APIs.
In a real sense, a network service orchestration tool is a vendor-neutral solution for
device configuration management. It uses device abstractions to map a vendor-specific
CLI or API through its YANG data models, thus providing a model-driven network-wide
interface for all network devices. It lets a network engineer create new and modify exist-
ing services using standardized models. The services are delivered faster and more effi-
ciently without any disruption, ensuring on-time deliveries and contractual service level
agreements (SLAs). The implementation of NSO varies from industry-to-industry on a
case-per-case basis. Many vendor solutions (e.g., Cisco NSO, evolution of the Tail-f Net-
work Control System (NCS), Juniper’s Contrail Service Orchestration and Anuta Networks
NCX) provide NSO integration with the existing networks.
2.4 Security Context
2.4.1 Justification
Security depends on both internal and external factors. To secure the network both
internally and externally, proper secure design methodologies include multiple layers of
defenses. Each layer implements various security policies and controls designed in a way
such that authorized users can access the network, while a user trying to perform any
malicious activity is blocked. For example, in the TCP/IP protocol suite, security can be
applied at the Internet or IP layer using IPSec, or security can be applied at the Transport
or TCP/UDP layer using SSL/TLS, or security can be applied at the Application layer
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using SSH. Since NETCONF messages are transported through SSH, the protocol is briefly
discussed in the next subsection.
2.4.2 SSH Protocol
Secure shell (SSH) is a protocol designed for secure connection to a remote computer
and secure remote command execution. It was initially released in 1995 by a Finnish re-
searcher Tatu Ylönen. The protocol works on a client-server architecture and is imple-
mented at the application layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack. A client is typically an appli-
cation that wants to connect to the SSH server. Default TCP and UDP port assigned by the
IANA for SSH operations is 22. The protocol establishes a secure cryptographic tunnel be-
tween the communicating parties, authenticating each side to other using a public-private
keypair, allowing them to encrypt-decrypt the requests and replies back and forth. It does
so by breaking the data into a series of packets. The packet includes the packet length,
padding amount, payload and the padding. The packet also has a message authentica-
tion code (MAC) for integrity checks. The whole packet excluding the packet length is
encrypted and sent forward to the other end. The receiving party receives the packet,
decrypts it and extracts the data (Ylonen & Lonvick, 2006) (Ylonen & Lonvick, 2005).
2.4.3 Security Analysis Techniques
While the protocols above ensure the security of data in transit, there are several threat
modeling techniques developed for secure design analysis and testing of a system. A few
of them are:
• Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Eleva-
tion of Privilege (STRIDE) by Microsoft (Kohnfelder & Garg, 1999).
• Damage, Reliability, Exploitability, Affected Users, and Discoverability (DREAD) by
Microsoft (Shostack, 2008).
• Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) by Carnegie
Mellon Software Engineering Institute (Caralli, Stevens, Young, & Wilson, 2007).
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• Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) by MITRE (Bar-
num, 2008)
• Threat Agent Risk Assessment (TARA) (Wynn et al., 2011) and Threat Agent Library
(TAL) by Intel (Casey, 2007).
• Guide to Data-Centric System Threat Modeling (Draft Special Publication 800-154)
by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Murugiah & Scarfone,
2016).
Furthermore, there are industry-wide best practices and frameworks for cyber risk
management and assessment. A few of them are:
• NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Barrett, 2018).
• Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) (COBIT, 2018)
• Center for Internet Security (CIS) Controls and Benchmarks (Controls, n.d.) (CIS,
n.d.).
• MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) Frame-
work (Strom et al., 2017).
The white paper presented by Shevchenko, Chick, O’Riordan, Scanlon, and Woody
(2018) lists the summary of some of these methods from a variety of sources (Shevchenko,
Chick, O’Riordan, Scanlon, & Woody, 2018). Despite having various such techniques,
STRIDE is chosen as the preferred threat modeling methodology for this study.
The term STRIDE is an acronym for six different security threats namely, Spoofing,
Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Priv-
ilege. It was developed in 1999 and adopted in 2002 by Microsoft as an internal drive to
produce secure software applications. Although STRIDE’s application is not limited to
just software, it was subsequently improved and used to model enterprise architectures,
networks, systems, or any particular asset with an intent to be protected against security
threats (Bodeau, McCollum, & Fox, 2018).
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2.4.4 Security Analysis of Network and Host Management
The white paper by Shevchenko et al. (2018) (Shevchenko et al., 2018) shows that a
significant amount of work has been done in developing techniques that allow adminis-
trators to evaluate the security of a system. Additionally, the study conducted by Bellovin
and Bush (2009) (Bellovin & Bush, 2009) explores the security aspect of configuration man-
agement of five different scenarios and outlines the challenges related to each of these.
Their research concludes that configuration management is vital for organizational secu-
rity. However, it is stated that there are many security-related challenges and further re-
search work needs to be done. Despite having the availability of various techniques, the
use of the existing techniques to do the security analysis of the configuration management




This chapter discusses the limitations related to the existing configuration and manage-
ment solutions that lead to the motivation presented in Chapter 1. The problem statement
itself has been classified into various segments and attempts to shed some light on many
issues with the current configuration and management schemes.
3.1 CLI and API Limitations
Today’s network infrastructure layer spans various domains consisting of network-
elements from multiple vendors with vendor-specific legacy CLIs and APIs. CLIs and APIs
are designed to access the native functionality of the device; however, there is no standard-
ization on writing and implementing the same. Each vendor has its own proprietary CLI
and set of APIs, which leads to the manual configurations using the custom build scripts
thus making it difficult to automate the network. No automation means spreadsheet-based
implementation, which subsequently leads to human errors and misconfiguration.
CLI also has the limitation of lack of transaction management. A configuration change
may involve changes to multiple devices or multiple changes on the same device. These
configuration changes cannot be implemented partially as this may leave the network to
an undefined state. Therefore, in case of any failure, there should be a mechanism to roll
back the changes and the network to its initial state. CLI fails to address this issue (Rizos,
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2016).
CLIs are designed to work with humans, but not the APIs for programmatic access.
Besides, a change in a device from a specific vendor in a network leads to change in API
calls across the entire network. Thus, every time a vendor makes a change in network
CLI or API, a network administrator has to re-write the scripts, which makes the network
costly to maintain.
Using a CLI has its pros and cons. CLIs are made to be user-friendly and more acces-
sible to operate. However, in a multi-vendor network, different types of network devices
can have different proprietary CLIs, and each operates through a unique set of commands.
A simple task requires a different set of commands across different CLIs, giving the same
output, but in a different format. Network engineers and operators spend many hours in
learning the syntax of the commands, thus spending a large chunk of time and money in
the learning process.
A CLI is fundamentally a tool to promote a vendor’s technology. In certain means, it
is a barrier to the adoption of another vendor’s equipment. By getting network engineers
highly invested in their CLI with its certification programs, equipment providers and ven-
dors try to entice the market into their ecosystem.
3.2 SNMP Limitations
SNMP was developed for both configuration management and monitoring of the de-
vices. However, for several reasons, it is used more frequently for monitoring and alerts
and not for configuring the changes — the main reason being the security and the stateless
nature of the protocol. SNMPv1 is the most widely deployed version, but it is not secure.
SNMPv2 development promised security but failed to achieve it. SNMPv3 was developed
with better security; however, it was not adopted as much by the industry because of its
complexity.
Security is not the only issue with SNMP. Because of its complexity, it also lacks stan-
dardized MIB modules, which makes it difficult for equipment vendors to design and
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implement the MIBs in a timely manner.
Another issue with SNMP is that it provides an unreliable transport mechanism as it
uses UDP for establishing the connection between the manager and the agents. UDP is a
session-less protocol, which means that messages can be easily lost during the transport.
SNMP uses a transactional model, but because of its session-less nature, SNMP man-
ager (or, NMS) may not know whether or not the devices have succeeded or failed. Since
messages are sent over UDP, the NMS and the agents need an added measure to deter-
mine the sequence of interactions. As another solution, the IETF has defined RFC3430 for
using SNMP over TCP. Although, the transactional model makes it further complicated to
implement the MIBs (Schoenwaelder, 2003) (Schoenwaelder, 2002).
Furthermore, SNMP is not efficient in large systems. It provides reasonable perfor-
mance when retrieving a small amount of data from a large set of devices. However, it
becomes slow when retrieving a large amount of data even from a small set of devices
(Schoenwaelder, 2003).
3.3 Host Management Limitations
Host management or configuration management tools are used for the automated man-
agement of large systems. Tools such as Puppet, Chef, Saltstack, and Ansible offer CLI and
GUI as the prime interface to push configurations to the managed devices. These configu-
rations are usually sent through a file called DSL. A DSL contains the device specifications
in a syntax very similar to the device implementation language. A multi-domain multi-
vendor network would require the configuration files for each type of device in their own
syntaxes. In such scenarios, management of configuration files in a heterogeneous network
becomes a burdensome task for a network administrator.
Additionally, the architecture of a host configuration management tool can be push
or pull based. In pull-based architecture, managed device agents fetch the configurations
from the manager. In push-based architecture, managers push the configuration to the
managed devices. In either case, authentication needs to take place between the manager
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and the agent. In push-based architecture, authentication information is written in plain-
text in configuration files (as demonstrated in A.5). Sending login credentials to managed
devices in plain-text through configuration files exposes a security risk (Delaet et al., 2010).
Another such scenario is a configuration change that requires a push operation to change
the username and password or keys on managed devices.
Configuration management tools also lack transactional support. Transactions are sig-
nificant when a device configuration fails, and the state of all the devices need to be rolled
back to the initial configuration state thus avoiding any misconfiguration in the network.
Because configurations are sent through configuration files, there is no automated mecha-
nism to roll back the state of the devices into its initial state.
3.4 Security Limitations
SNMP has security drawbacks and using host management tools itself does not pro-
vide any concrete security. While reviewing the host management tools for configuration
management, it was found that the existing literature lacks the security analysis of config-
uration management tools. Therefore, a security analysis needs to be done and it needs to
be determined how introducing NETCONF and YANG for the configuration management
of the host systems affects the overall security posture of the network.
3.5 Demerits of Host Management using Traditional Methods
This section lists the demerits of the traditional host management methods. Subse-
quently, Chapter 4 will introduce the merits of host management using an advanced NET-
CONF and YANG based method.
• SNMP, CLI, and most of the configuration management tools lack transaction man-
agement. There is no in-built mechanism to roll back the network to its initial state
in case a configuration failure occurs.
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• CLIs and APIs are vendor-specific proprietary solutions. There is no standardization
on writing and implementing the same.
• CLIs are designed to work with humans and are hard to automate.
• Initial versions of SNMP were not secure and were less advanced. Despite various
improvements, SNMP is used more frequently for monitoring and alerts, and not for
configuring the changes.
• SNMP is an IETF standardized protocol, but it lacks standardized MIB modules and
has an unreliable transport mechanism.
• Using configuration management tools, configurations are usually sent to devices
through DSL files, which are a collection of files and scripts. In a heterogeneous





This chapter outlines how introducing NETCONF and YANG for the configuration and
management of host systems could address the problems discussed in Chapter 3. The pro-
posed solution employs a model-driven approach for host management and offers a single
point of management through a programmatic interface, thus reducing the complexity of
the network, and providing network-wide transactions, reliability, and security.
4.1 NETCONF and YANG based Host Management
To address the challenges and limitations with the network configuration and manage-
ment solutions, IETF has defined two key standards:
(1) NETCONF protocol API
(2) YANG data modeling language
The proposed solution includes a combination of a network configuration management
solution called NSO (NSO, n.d.) and a data model driven management plane framework
called ConfD (ConfD, n.d.). Combining NSO and ConfD provides a NETCONF and YANG
based management framework for the host device configurations in the network. It also
extends support for management interfaces such as CLI, SNMP, and legacy interfaces that
are still widely used in configuring the network devices as well as host systems.
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NSO at a Glance
NSO is a network configuration and management application that provides a central
configuration and management point for multi-vendor device automation and orchestra-
tion of the entire network. It has support for various northbound and southbound network
management protocols such as NETCONF, SNMP, CLI, and more (as shown in Figure 4.1).
For a NETCONF operation, NSO can be loaded with the YANG data models of a device.
These data models are made available by the IETF, the OpenfConfig, or the device ven-
dor itself. Once NSO has the data models, it can be instructed to manipulate the device
configuration using the NETCONF protocol.
ConfD at a Glance
ConfD is a data model driven management framework that is meant to be integrated
with network devices that want to implement NETCONF protocol. It executes as a Unix
daemon on the target network device and acts as a NETCONF agent for the NETCONF
protocol. ConfD’s LinuxCfg package interacts with the ConfD daemon and provides a set
of managed network interfaces for the Linux OS. The network properties and functional-
ities that can be managed using LinuxCfg package depend on the data models described
in the YANG modules specifications structured within the individual components of the
package. ConfD also has support for additional northbound and southbound management
protocols such as SNMP and CLI (as shown in Figure 4.1).
The Glue - NSO Network Element Driver (NED)
Network-wide transactions are initialized within NSO by a network engineer or a net-
work management application through one of the northbound management protocols or
interfaces. An initiated transaction spans all the way to a device connected to a south-
bound interface using a NED. To interact with a Linux managed object enabled with
ConfD, a NED is built using the Pioneer package in NSO. A NED can be built using the
YANG data models for a NETCONF device or using the MIBs for an SNMP device.
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CDB
Network Element Driver (NED)













Network Engineers and Management Applications








Managed Objects (Host Devices)
Figure 4.1: NETCONF and YANG based management of host systems
NSO1 (NSO, n.d.), ConfD2 (ConfD, n.d.)
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4.2 Solution Capabilities
NETCONF and YANG based management of host systems provides many improve-
ments as compared to other alternatives discussed in the problem statement chapter. The
following subsections summarizes the superiorities of the proposed solution:
Transactions and Roll-backs
Host management tools (or, configuration management tools) do not have any primi-
tives for transactions. NETCONF protocol has in-built primitives that support transaction-
oriented operations. Transactions are very important when a configuration change needs
to be implemented on multiple devices at once. Transaction-oriented property of NET-
CONF ensures that configuration change operation is successful on all devices, and if it
fails for any reason, then the protocol instructs the management application to reverse the
network to its initial state. Therefore, when a configuration change is pushed, all network
devices are either transformed into a new state, or they are rolled-back to its initial state.
This assures there are no half-done, broken or stray configurations in the network (Enns et
al., 2011).
Transactions are performed by acquiring configuration locks on all target devices in the
network. The lock is kept until configurations are applied on all devices and the valida-
tion is performed for the applied configurations. Validate operation checks for any syntax
or semantics errors in the configurations before it is loaded into the device. Locks are re-
leased on all target device once the configuration change is completely implemented or
completely discarded. All these operations are performed simultaneously in a transac-
tional order on all target devices in the network (Enns et al., 2011).
In addition, if the device does not support roll-backs, NSO can calculate the difference
between the current and the previous state of the device and can accordingly apply the
configuration changes. When a device is on-boarded to NSO, NSO knows the capabili-
ties supported by that device. Depending on the device capabilities, NSO can issue the
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appropriate commands to the device using the configuration copy that is saved in its con-
figuration database CDB at all times. CDB is shown in Figure 4.1.
Reliability
NETCONF-based management provides a persistent connection between the client
and the server. All protocol messages are sent over TCP. TCP is a reliable protocol that
checks if everything sent by the sender was received by the receiving end without any
packet loss. That means acknowledgment of each and every configuration sent to the
client is being reported to the server. In case of any errors, all the connection failures are
also reported to the server. If a connection drops, the server can then automatically re-
lease all the locks acquired by the client. The locks are kept until it is explicitly released
by the client or until the connection times out. This ensures efficient and reliable resource
consumption (Enns et al., 2011).
Multi-vendor Interoperability and Extensibility
The YANG data modeling language provides a model-driven approach to network
programmability and management. Using the YANG models in NSO, it becomes easy
to inter-connect devices supported by different vendors in an enterprise. These devices
need not necessarily support NETCONF as the management protocol in-built into them.
It is because a network administrator can simultaneously manage a CLI, SNMP, and a
NETCONF-based device using a single programmatic interface.
Besides, YANG provides a modular approach to add or remove any network function
and controls using its data models. If at any time, a new network feature needs to be added
to a device type, the network administrator need not re-write the whole CLI or API for the
device. For example, if a network administrator needs to make particular changes in a
host system to add functionalities such as IP address, DNS, NTP, etc., then a programmer
can build the YANG module for these specific configurations without re-writing the data
models for the entire host system. Thus, YANG modules are extensible and make it easy
to add or remove functionalities needed for the device management in an ad-hoc fashion.
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Performance and Scalability
Hedstrom et al. did a head-to-head quantitative comparison of NETCONF and SNMP.
Their research found that NETCONF is also better than SNMP in terms of performance
and scalability. SNMP is faster for a lower number of devices, whereas NETCONF pro-
vides better performance as the device count goes up. This clearly shows that NETCONF
transactional property provides better performance in large networks. They also found
that NETCONF has higher bandwidth utilization as compared to SNMP. However, the
higher bandwidth requirement is because of the protocol overheads due to the added se-
curity measures, connection-oriented nature, and capability exchange features (Hedstrom,
Watwe, & Sakthidharan, 2011).
4.3 Security Efficiencies
NETCONF-based management of host systems introduces a secure management scheme.
The protocol possesses various security improvements as compared to legacy configura-
tion management solutions such as SNMP and CLI. It enhances security in two ways. One,
it provides a secure transport mechanism to send and receive sensitive information. Sec-
ond, it provides an access control mechanism to restrict the use of sensitive information.
Regardless, security also depends on a third factor, which is the security of application that
stores or releases such sensitive information (Enns et al., 2011). The following subsections
discuss each of these security considerations.
4.3.1 Secure Transport
Secure transport mechanism of NETCONF provides confidentiality, integrity, authen-
tication, replay protection, and sequential data delivery for the sensitive information in
transit between the NETCONF server (a manager) and the client (a device). Sensitive in-
formation can be the configuration data, state data or the data related to protocol messages.
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Configuration data often contains usernames, passwords, keys, and network topology re-
lated information. Any malicious activity in the network can open doors for a man-in-the-
middle (MitM) attack allowing an adversary to modify or inject data in the configuration
files. NETCONF provides secure transport of the configuration data and secures the trans-
mission against an adversarial attack.
NETCONF transport layer security can be implemented in many ways. NETCONF
over SSH is the most widely used and mandatory implementation of the protocol. The
protocol specifications for NETCONF over SSH are defined in IETF RFC6242 (Wasserman,
2011). A NETCONF connection over SSH is initiated by a client with the server over TCP
on IANA assigned port 830. SSH transport layer protocol (Ylonen & Lonvick, 2005) man-
dates the authentication of both the client and the server before any configuration, or state
data can be exchanged between both the parties, thus avoiding the exchange of messages
with an incorrect identity. Once the connection is established, SSH then provides strong
encryption of messages for data privacy and also supports integrity checks. This is harder
to achieve using SNMP.
Another implementation of NETCONF is the use of the TLS protocol to secure the
NETCONF message exchanges. Specifications for NETCONF over TLS are defined in
IETF RFC7589 (Badra, Luchuk, & Schoenwaelder, 2015). A NETCONF connection over
TLS is initiated by a client with the server over TCP on IANA assigned port 6513. The
client starts the TLS handshake process with the server, which is used to authenticate each
other’s identity using certificates (Dierks & Rescorla, 2008) (Rescorla, 2018). Once the TLS
handshake process is finished, the client can start sending and receiving encrypted XML
documents with the server in the rpc and rpc-reply messages respectively.
Additionally, NETCONF protocol design further allows and extends the implementa-
tion of NETCONF over SOAP, defined in RFC4743 (Goddard, 2006), and NETCONF over
BEEP, defined in RFC4744 (Lear & Crozier, 2006), thus opening the scope for further secu-
rity enhancements in environments that support these protocol implementations.
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4.3.2 Access Control Model
Since configuration and state data can be confidential and sensitive, therefore it should
be accessible to the authorized users and systems only. Without a standard access control
model, every NETCONF protocol user has the permissions of a user equivalent to the root
user. NETCONF access control model (NACM) provides security by limiting the resources
and data that a user or an adversary can reach or attack. A user can be part of a group,
and a group is assigned access to the defined protocol operations. Once a user has authen-
ticated itself to the server, the NETCONF transport layer transfers the username and the
group associated with the client to the server. The server then enforces the access control
on the client based on the username and the group (Bierman & Bjorklund, 2012) (Bierman
& Bjorklund, 2018)
NACM limits NETCONF user’s access using control rules such as permit and deny,
and operations such as create, read, update, delete (CRUD), execute, and none (Bierman
& Bjorklund, 2012). On the contrary, SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 have the concept of defining
communities. These communities are defined in SNMP communities page which asso-
ciates communities with access rights. Whereas, CLIs employ an extra login sequence to
give access to the configuration mode. Some proprietary CLIs allow users to be added
to groups that have limited access privileges. However, NACM offers possibilities that
are not available in SNMP and CLI as they have no precise, well-defined, standardized
method to limit authenticated user’s rights and permissions.
4.3.3 Security of Management Application
There are many different management applications, and their implementation varies
from one enterprise to another. These management applications usually do not actively
impose any security measures. However, their application and implementation are de-
signed to improve the overall security posture of the entire network. For example, NSO
improves the security as it provides configuration rollbacks, which is useful to avoid any
stray configurations in the network that could arise while implementing changes such as
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VPN or ACLs. Besides, it enforces consistent security policies across all devices in the net-
work. It also avoids human-related configuration errors and saves audit logs, which helps
keep track and in minimizing any security risk caused due to misconfiguration.
4.4 Testing NETCONF and YANG based Host Management
The testing method involves the description of the process involving the compilation
of standard YANG data models to access and modify the configuration and management
of some common properties within a host device that exposes a NETCONF interface.
The NETCONF interface on a host device is exposed by installing ConfD management
interface tool on the device. In ConfD, confdc compiler is the main development tool that
is used to build the ConfD’s LinuxCfg application package. ConfD’s LinuxCfg package
implements some widely used YANG specifications such as system management, interface
management, IP management, etc. Since, YANG is a modular data modeling language, a
network engineer with programming experience can add or remove modules on the basis
of the requirements of the customer.
During the first step of building the LinuxCfg package, confdc compiler in ConfD uses
the YANG data model and compiles it into to a .fxs file. A .fxs file is the compiled binary
version of the YANG data model. When ConfD starts, all compiled .fxs files form the
schema of the database. Since LinuxCfg uses C programming, confdc further takes the .fxs
schema file as an input and generates a header file with all the namespaces and constants
that contains mapping to interact with the ConfD core API. The next step in the build
process involves the generation of OS object file and linking the .o file to executables which
are linked to ConfD as well as system library. At this point, the build process is finished
and ConfD could be started to interact with the Linux host.
The compilation process can be tested using the confdc command to compile a YANG
data module ietf_system.yang.
vi jay@host :~/ confd−6.6/examples . confd/ l i n u x c f g / i e t f _ s y s t e m $ confdc −c i e t f−system . yang
Confdc compiler generates a .fxs file, which can be further compiled to generate a
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header file ietf_system.h. The .h and C programming code in the .c file in LinuxCfg then
interact with the Linux kernel for configuring the properties supported by the YANG mod-
ules.
The command below shows the information about the generated .fxs file. It is impor-
tant to note that the generated .fxs file has dependencies on three standard namespaces.
vi jay@host :~/ confd−6.6/examples . confd/ l i n u x c f g / i e t f _ s y s t e m $ confdc −−get−i n f o i e t f−system . f x s
f x s f i l e
Confdc vers ion : " 6 . 6 _1 " ( current Confdc vers ion = " 6 . 6 _1 " )
u r i : urn : i e t f : params : xml : ns : yang : i e t f−system
id : urn : i e t f : params : xml : ns : yang : i e t f−system
p r e f i x : " sys "
f l a g s : 118
type : cs
mountpoint : undefined
exported agents : a l l
dependencies : [ ’ urn : i e t f : params : xml : ns : yang : iana−crypt−hash ’ ,
’ urn : i e t f : params : xml : ns : yang : i e t f−ine t−types ’ ,
’ urn : i e t f : params : xml : ns : yang : i e t f−yang−types ’ ]
embedded YANG source : i e t f−system@2014−08−06
source : " i e t f−system . yang "
checksum : 4760 dac8fdc2f fcd66f115aa2c3fd67e
cdb checksum : 4597898 ec785e962e88c18cf9207022a
All these dependencies listed above should be supported by the NETCONF server on
the host machine. This could be tested and verified by connecting to the northbound NET-
CONF interface of the host machine using the southbound NETCONF interface of the
NSO. If the device returns the list of YANG modules, it means it is reachable through
NSO.
For example, below is the test for a host device added by the name "test" using pioneer
package in NSO. Pioneer fetches the list of YANG modules supported by the host device.
Before performing this test, the device is first added to an authgroup and then added into
NSO using the device credentials as described under Section A.3.8 of Appendix A.
admin@ncs ( conf ig ) # d e v i c e s d e v i c e t e s t p i o n e e r yang f e t c h− l i s t
Retr iev ing module l i s t from device
Device does not repor t support f o r netconf−monitoring , t r y i n g anyway
Found out the names f o r a t o t a l of 19 modules
h e l l o message : 19
netconf−monitoring subtree : 0
netconf−monitoring xpath : 0
Marked module i e t f−netconf f o r download
Marked module i e t f−ip f o r download
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Marked module IF−MIB f o r download
Marked module i e t f−i n t e r f a c e s f o r download
Marked module i e t f−ine t−types f o r download
Marked module IANAifType−MIB f o r download
Marked module IP−MIB f o r download
Marked module t a i l f −acm f o r download
Marked module iana−crypt−hash f o r download
Marked module i e t f−netconf−acm f o r download
Marked module i e t f−system f o r download
Marked module UDP−MIB f o r download
Marked module INET−ADDRESS−MIB f o r download
Marked module iana−i f−type f o r download
Marked module TCP−MIB f o r download
Marked module i e t f−netconf−with−d e f a u l t s f o r download
Marked module i e t f−yang−types f o r download
Marked module SNMPv2−TC f o r download
Marked module t a i l f −aaa f o r download
message Marked 19 modules f o r download , skipped 0
yang−d i r e c t o r y /tmp/download/ t e s t
A successful test run of the above command indicates that the NETCONF connection
from NSO to the host device is feasible and that the host device supports the YANG mod-
ules returned by the device in the pioneer fetch list. The final step is to build the NED
package and then reload it to NSO as described under Section A.7 of the Appendix A.
Once NED is reloaded, a network engineer can log into NSO CLI and can perform the
configuration supported by the device.
Below is a test run of the ietf_system YANG component to change the hostname of the
device:
host ( conf ig ) # sys t em
P o s s i b l e completions :
c lock c o n t a c t dns−r e s o l v e r hostname l o c a t i o n ntp
host ( conf ig ) # sys t em hostname ServerEV8Concord ia
host ( conf ig ) # commit
Commit complete .
ServerEV8Concordia ( conf ig ) #
The structure and syntax of the CLI commands can be well understood by looking over
the Pyang tree format output of the ietf_system YANG module. From Figure 4.2, system is
the container and hostname is one of the leaves in that container. Hostname has a derived
type inet:domain-name defined in the urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:inet-types namespace
under imported ietf-inet-types module.
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Figure 4.2: pyang tree format translation of ietf_system YANG module
4.5 Merits of Host Management using NETCONF and YANG
It is obvious to have the thought that the same job of changing a hostname or any
other configuration can be achieved using the configuration management tools such as
Ansible or simply using the device CLI. However, an enterprise-level implementation of
NETCONF and YANG based host management using Cisco NSO has a number of benefits
as compared to other approaches, such as:
• Network-wide transactions with support for roll back in case of configuration failure
while provisioning services on a device in the network.
• Multi-vendor interoperability through a single network-wide CLI or Web UI for all
the devices in the network.
• Easier network discovery and topology scan of the devices in the network making it
simple for a network engineer to understand and provision network services.
• Extensibility by adding standardized YANG models as per the business require-
ments of the customer.
• Automation of network tasks using a rich set of northbound APIs such as Java and
Python.




This chapter examines and evaluates the security of the two different approaches for
host management. One is configuration and management using a configuration manage-
ment tool such as Ansible and the other being NETCONF and YANG based management
solution using NSO for the configuration and management of host systems.
5.1 Threat Modeling
A threat is a security loophole that could have a possible impact on the integrity of a
network, a system, or software application. Threat modeling is a risk assessment technique
useful to brainstorm and classify these potential security threats.
There are several threat modeling techniques available from a variety of sources. The
application of each and every technique varies from industry to industry (Shevchenko
et al., 2018). Some of these techniques are STRIDE (Kohnfelder & Garg, 1999), DREAD
(Shostack, 2008), OCTAVE Allegro (Caralli et al., 2007), CAPEC (Barnum, 2008), TARA/-
TAL (Wynn et al., 2011) (Casey, 2007), NIST SP 800-154 (Murugiah & Scarfone, 2016), and
Attack Trees (Schneier, 1999). For this study, STRIDE is chosen as the preferred method to
identify the security threats because the technique focuses on the security analysis of the
complete system from an end-user’s perspective.
The idea behind using STRIDE is that any application falls under a predictable set of
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threats. For the identification of these potential threats, a data flow diagram (DFD) of the
application is drawn in Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool (Microsoft, n.d.). A DFD is drawn
using the components by selecting processes, external interactors, data stores, data flows,
trust line boundaries, and trust border boundaries. Once the visualized sketch is ready,
STRIDE modeling is applied at each data entry and exit point and the processes to identify
the threats that put application and assets at risk. Any data interaction that crosses trust
boundaries exposes further opportunities for adversaries. Finally, on the basis of the data
flow diagram, all the potential threats are listed as well as categorized by their severity.
Based on the findings, appropriate mitigations are reported.
Prior to doing STRIDE, a network operator would have to "guess" what security mech-
anisms are needed to find out the potential threats in a system.
Applying STRIDE gives a full list of the threats and the STRIDE done in this thesis
gives suggested mitigations for each of these. This would give confidence to the network
operators in building systems that are secure and less vulnerable to security breaches.
The list below describes the meaning of each of these threats with examples, the corre-
sponding security property that is violated and example mitigation that could be applied
to improve the security.
• Spoofing: It is pretending to be something or someone else by illegitimately acquir-
ing the identity. For example, spoofing someone’s IP or MAC address. This is a threat
against authentication and can be mitigated using passwords and digital signatures.
• Tampering: It is the modification of legitimate information for a malicious purpose.
For example, modifying username, password, or something saved on disk. This is a
threat against data integrity and can be mitigated using ACLs and digital signatures.
• Repudiation: It is claiming, denying or disowning to have performed an action.
For example, removing logs from the system and claiming not to have acted. This
is a threat against non-repudiation and can be mitigated using secure logging and





Process Circle It represents processes, programs, or services
run by the computer, e.g., a kernel process.
Interactor Square or rectangle It represents the endpoints connected to the
system, e.g., users, clients, servers, etc.
Data Store Two parallel hori-
zontal lines
It represents databases, files, registry keys, etc.
Data Flow One way arrow It represents data in motion over networks, e.g.,
data over TCP, UDP, or RPC channels.
Trust Line
Boundary






It represents a trust boundary between trusted
and untrusting components.
Table 5.1: Threat modeling DFD components
• Information Disclosure: It is a breach of information to someone not authorized to
access it. For example, tapping data and data leak in transit. This is a threat against
confidentiality and can be mitigated using encryption and ACLs.
• Denial of Service: It is the disruption of service for legitimate users. For example,
not able to access a network device or host system because of exhausted resources.
This is a threat against availability and can be mitigated using packet filtering, load
balancers and ACLs.
• Elevation of Privilege: It is getting a higher privilege to access a network device or a
host system that a user is not authorized to log into. For example, getting root login
access to a network device without proper authorization. This is a threat against
authorization and can be mitigated using input validation and ACLs.
The very first step to analyze a system using STRIDE is to brainstorm and build the
DFD model of the system. A DFD contains the essential components of the system and its
interaction with the other internal and external components. Table 5.1 lists the components
available in the Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool to build a DFD and describes their mean-
ing. Each of these components is susceptible to a set of threats listed in Table 5.2. Table 5.2











Process X X X X X X
Interactor X X
Data Store X X X
Data Flow X X X
Table 5.2: Threat matrix of components
5.2 Threat Analysis
The security model of two different approaches has been constructed under Subsection
5.2.1 and 5.2.2. As the first step, DFD is derived using the architecture of the application
under inspection. For the security evaluation, the STRIDE threat modeling is applied to the
respective component types listed in Table 5.1. Next, appropriate mitigation is suggested
for all the listed threats. Finally, a threat matrix is generated as per Table 5.2.
It is important to note that security of any application needs to be considered from day
one commencing with the requirements analysis phase. The following security analyses
are not intended to analyze the vulnerabilities of the applications through penetration test-
ing and code analysis techniques. Instead, it is intended to analyze the security of a system
from an architectural point of view.
5.2.1 Security Analysis of Configuration Management using Ansible
There is a wide variety of configuration management tools available in the market, and
their implementation varies from industry to industry (Delaet et al., 2010). For this study,
Ansible is chosen as the preferred tool as it is not only used for configuration manage-
ment and automation, but it also supports the orchestration of the network devices and
host systems. Besides, it also has modules that provide support for unified configuration
management with Cisco NSO using Ansible NSO modules.
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DFD Overview
Ansible has a straightforward architecture. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the high-level DFD
of Ansible in a typical IT environment. Any host system that has Ansible installed is
known as the Control Node. All modules, plugins, tasks, playbooks are stored in the an-
sible control node. A control node is a host machine that sends configuration commands
to the Managed Nodes. A managed node is a host machine or a network device that can
be configured using Ansible. It is not required to have a specific application or a package
to be installed on managed nodes, except SSH for enabling the connection from control
nodes. Ansible ships with many connection plugins; however, SSH is the default protocol
used for system administration.
A network engineer connects to the Ansible control node using a bi-directional remote
connection application having support for Telnet or SSH to send the configuration com-
mands to the managed nodes. In a standard IT environment, a control node and managed
node are located at the data center within the trusted private network of the corporation.
Trusted network of an enterprise is referred by the term Corpnet in the Microsoft threat
modeling tool. The term Corpnet is used very often by the enterprises to define their trust
boundary. A network engineer can connect to the control node through Corpnet LAN
or from outside the trusted network using Telnet or SSH. Enterprises also enable public
network connections to their trusted private network using IPsec or SSL VPN.
Processes
From the DFD in Figure 5.1, there are two processes viz., control node and managed
node. Since only the control node process is under scrutiny, any security relationship with
the managed node will be explained separately. From Table 5.2, processes are susceptible
to all six STRIDE threats.
• Spoofing: An attacker may spoof the identity of the control node. For example,
spoofing of identities such as IP address and MAC address may lead to information
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Figure 5.1: High-level DFD of configuration management using Ansible
disclosure such as username and password if sent in plain-text by a network engi-
neer. If an attacker impersonates the IP address of a control node, she can modify
the packet headers so that the packet appears to come from a trusted system. She
may subsequently send incorrect configurations or may completely shut down all
the managed nodes. To mitigate spoofing attacks, a mutual authentication mecha-
nism must be used to identify the destination process.
• Tampering: An attacker may tamper with the input data in transit. Failure to verify
the input data entering the firewall northbound interface can cause a large number
of exploitable issues. For example, this may lead to attacks such as information dis-
closure, denial of service or an elevation of privilege attack against Ansible control
node. Therefore, all input data must be verified for correctness using a standard
input validation technique. An attacker can also modify or tamper with the pro-
cess binaries. However, the Linux kernel is not under scrutiny in this threat model.
To mitigate tampering attacks, a message authentication mechanism, filtering using
ACLS, or digital signatures must be used.
• Repudiation: An attacker or even a legitimate user logged into the control node
may make configuration changes on the managed node and may later deny having
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done so. To mitigate repudiation attacks, logging or auditing is used. Mitigation
for this attack on the control node exists within the Ansible application itself. By de-
fault, Ansible logging is off unless a path such as #log_path = /var/log/ansible.log is
specified in the "ansible.cfg" config file. Therefore, to mitigate this attack, a network
manager can define the #log_path variable in the Ansible config file.
• Information Disclosure: An attacker may sniff the data sent by the network engineer
to the control node. This data can lead to information disclosure attack revealing the
network configurations and can later be misused to attack other parts of the system.
Therefore, all input and output connections coming in and going out from the control
node through a trust boundary must be encrypted. To mitigate this attack, use of
secure connection protocol such as SSH or a privacy-enhanced protocol such as TLS
is recommended.
Information disclosure may also be caused due to a vulnerability in the Ansible na-
tive application. For example, a recent high-risk vulnerability in the Ansible "user"
module allowed an insider adversary to access sensitive information on the targeted
system (CVE-2018-16837, 2018). To mitigate such issues, it is advised to update the
application and apply the appropriate patches.
• Denial of Service: An attacker may flood the Ansible control node with illegitimate
requests causing the services to crash, halt or run slowly. This violates the availabil-
ity matrix as the control node might not be able to serve any further requests by the
network engineer. To mitigate this attack, techniques such as source address filter-
ing, hardening of the server, implementation of load balancers and high availabil-
ity using the management of primary and secondary control node is recommended
(Montgomery, Sriram, Carson, & Santay, 2016).
• Elevation Of Privilege: An attacker may get privileged access to the Ansible control
node and may change the entire topology of the system. For example, in an environ-
ment without proper authentication, an attacker with a privileged set of read-only
permissions may elevate the permission set to read-and-write. In order to get write
47
access, an attacker may create or modify the user profile having the privileged set of
access. To mitigate this attack, processes should be run with the least privilege pos-
sible. Countermeasure techniques such as ACLs, authentication, and data validation
are recommended.
Interactors
From the DFD in Figure 5.1, the network engineer is the interactor interacting with the
Ansible control node. From Table 5.2, interactors are prone to spoofing and repudiation
attack.
• Spoofing: Spoofing attack corresponds to the impersonation of a valid user. If an
attacker impersonates the identity of a valid network engineer, she may be able to
perform several attacks on the system and may instruct the control node to imple-
ment incorrect network configurations. An impersonated network engineer may also
lead to data being sent to the attacker’s target instead of network engineer. A spoof-
ing attack is mitigated by the use of a two-way authentication mechanism in which
both the parties, network engineer and the control node, authenticate each other at
the same time. An example of a two-way authentication technique is Kerberos.
• Repudiation: An attacker or even an insider network engineer may send a illegit-
imate request to the Ansible control node and may later deny doing so. This can
be avoided by using logging or auditing to record the source, time and summary
of the received data on the control node. All event logs in the network can also be
forwarded and saved in the Syslog server.
Data Flows
From the DFD in Figure 5.1, there are three data flows corresponding to the Ansible
control node viz., the inbound flow of traffic from network engineer to control node, the
outbound flow of output data from the control node to network engineer and the outbound
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flow of configuration data from the control node to managed node. From Table 5.2, data
flows are vulnerable to tampering, information disclosure and denial of service attack.
• Tampering: Data in transit between the network engineer and the control node can
be tampered with by injecting malicious information. For example, an attacker can
tamper with the sensitive input configuration changes sent by the network engineer
to the control node. She can also sniff the operational data sent back by the control
node to the network engineer. The sniffed data can be later manipulated to perform
a high severity attack. As a countermeasure, the data flow between the network
engineer and control node must be protected using digital signatures or a message
authentication code technique. Data flow between the control node and the managed
node is protected using SSH by default.
• Information Disclosure: As mentioned under the previous bullet point, an attacker
can sniff the data flow at various interfaces to perform a planned attack on other
managed devices or servers. The data flow from an inbound and outbound interface
on the northbound side of the control node can be protected by encrypting the data
flow using a secure connection protocol such as SSH. The mitigation for protection
of data flow from the southbound interface of the control node to the northbound
interface of the managed node exists in Ansible architecture using SSH.
• Denial of Service: As a result of DoS attack, an attacker or an external unauthorized
interactor may interrupt data flow in either direction. If an attacker floods the data
flow from network engineer to control node, then the control node would crash, and
no further communication could be established by the network engineer with the
control node. If an attacker floods the data flow from the control node to network
engineer, then the network engineer system would crash; however, the likeliness of
this occurrence is negligible. If an attacker floods the data flow from the control node
to the managed node, then the managed node would crash and would not be able to
provide the intended services. As a countermeasure, packet filtering firewalls, IP re-
striction, network monitoring, and bandwidth control methods can be implemented.
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Component Type Interaction S T R I D E
Control Node X X * X X X
Processes
Managed Node X X X X X X
Interactors Network Engineer X X
Network Engineer to Control Node X X X
Control Node to Network Engineer X X -Data Flows
Control Node to Managed Node * * X
1 X Indicates mitigation exists by the suggested method.
2 * Indicates mitigation mechanism exists in the application architecture.
3 - Indicates the likeliness of this event does not affect the main process.
4 Blank indicates that the threat does not affect the component.
Table 5.3: Threat matrix of configuration management using Ansible
Threat matrix generated by doing the security analysis of the components involved is
outlined in Table 5.3.
Note: In some enterprises, Ansible architecture may also consist of cloud-based man-
aged nodes hosted on the Internet as well as a repository of configuration items (CIs) how-
ever, their analysis is out-of-scope for this study.
5.2.2 Security Analysis of NETCONF and YANG based Host Management us-
ing NSO
For this study, Cisco NSO is chosen as the preferred orchestration tool as it is free to use
for non-production use. It is enabled by NETCONF and YANG and bridges technologies
such as SDN and NFV for automating services across traditional and modern networks.
DFD Overview
As demonstrated in Figure 5.2, Cisco NSO has comparatively a complex architecture.
The NSO application package is installed on a Linux or macOS based host platform. This
machine serves as the NETCONF client and manages host machines that act as the NET-
CONF server. All YANG related data such as device models and service models are stored
in an external datastore entity called CDB or YANG datastore. All connections are TCP/IP
based and default connection type used for network administration is SSH.
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Figure 5.2: High-level DFD of NETCONF and YANG based host management using NSO
A network engineer connects to the NSO host machine to send the configuration com-
mands to the managed objects. In a standard IT environment, the NSO, the YANG datas-
tore, and the managed objects are all located at the data center within the Corpnet trusted
network. A network engineer can connect to NSO through Corpnet LAN or from outside
the trusted network using VPN. All cloud hosted devices are present at remote locations
and their connectivity to NSO is enabled using SSH.
As a complete configuration management solution, NSO sits on top of network ap-
plications such as software-defined networking (SDN) controllers and network functions
virtualization (NFVs) managers, as shown in Figure 4.1. However, SDN and NFV have
different applications and therefore they have not been included in this analysis.
Processes
DFD in Figure 5.2 consists of five processes viz., NSO (the main process under scrutiny),
the managed object, public cloud hosted devices, SDN controller and NFV manager. Any
security relationship of NSO with the connected components will be described individu-
ally. From Table 5.2, processes are susceptible to all six STRIDE threats.
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• Spoofing: An attacker may impersonate the identity of the NSO process, which may
lead to unauthorized access to other connected processes. A process should be able
to verify the identity of NSO exactly as needed using a proper authentication mecha-
nism. Mitigation for this threat exists in the NSO application architecture itself. Each
device’s credential in NSO is set up using an "authgroup", which is a PGM group
(username, password, enable password). Once a device is added to authgroup, NSO
then pulls the SSH keys from the device to verify the identity to each other. Similarly,
NSO has in-built bi-directional authentication mechanism for the network engineer,
the source processes and the other supported northbound interfaces. A user can be
authenticated using local authentication, pluggable authentication module (PAM),
and external authentication. PAM can be configured to work with remote authentica-
tion dial-in user service (RADIUS) and lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP).
• Tampering: Data flowing across northbound input interface may be tampered with
by an attacker. Failure to verify that input is a root cause of a considerable number of
exploitable issues. This may lead to several attacks against NSO such as information
disclosure, denial of service or an elevation of privilege attack. Kernel binaries of
the native OS could also be modified or tampered by an attacker. However, the
Linux or macOS kernel is not under scrutiny in this threat model. To mitigate this
attack, consider all input paths and the way they handle data. Verify that all input
is verified for correctness using an approved list input validation approach. Use of
ACLs to specify the access rights can also be used as a countermeasure technique.
• Repudiation: NSO can claim that it did not receive configuration change instructions
from a source outside the trust boundary. Similarly, an attacker or even a legitimate
user may log into NSO and make configuration changes and may later deny having
done so. To mitigate this attack, logging or auditing is used to record the source,
time, and summary of the events. NSO has inbuilt mechanism for capturing logs.
Logging can be enabled via "ncs.conf" configuration file in NSO. Logs are stored
under "audit.log" and "ncs.log" file and are located at /var/log/ncs folder for system
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installs or under local installation folder for local install.
• Information Disclosure: An attacker may sniff data flowing across the NSO north-
bound input interface sent by the network engineer. This data may include sensitive
network configurations thereby gaining access to underlying network routing and
topology. Furthermore, depending on what type of data an attacker can read, it may
be used to attack other parts of the system or can be a disclosure of information lead-
ing to compliance violations. To mitigate this attack, consider encrypting the data
flow using SSH or TLS. SSH provides a secure connection mechanism whereas TLS
ensures confidentiality by using symmetric data encryption and authentication using
TLS handshake.
• Denial of Service: DoS or distributed DoS is a tactic used to flood a system with
illegitimate requests from multiple compromised computers. NSO under DoS attack
may crash, halt or run slowly. This may cause a significant business impact as the
NSO process would not be able to serve any immediate configuration changes. To
mitigate this attack, techniques such as source address filtering, hardening of the
server, implementation of load balancers and high availability using the manage-
ment of the primary and secondary process is recommended. NSO has connection
time out feature to release the resources after a specified period of time. However, in
case of a DoS attack that does not make much sense as the attacker would keep on
consuming the resources as soon as they are released. Another feature that supports
high availability in NSO is the NSO clustering feature that can serve local and remote
devices both at the same time.
• Elevation Of Privilege: NSO may be subjected to an elevation of privilege using re-
mote code execution by an external malicious entity. A recent vulnerability in the
NSO application allowed an unauthenticated malicious user to gain unauthorized
access of affected NSO system. The vulnerability could be exploited because of an
incomplete input validation for authentication performed by NSO plug and play
component package. Once exploited, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to
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the configurations of the managed objects connected to NSO (CVE-2018-0463, 2018).
Another similar vulnerability in the NSO CLI parser allowed the attacker to execute
arbitrary commands with root privileges on the targeted systems (CVE-2018-0274,
2018). To mitigate such attacks, techniques such as input validation, data execution
prevention, running applications with least privilege and patching with updated ver-
sions are recommended.
Interactors
From the DFD in Figure 5.2, network engineer is the interactor interacting with NSO.
From Table 5.2, interactors are prone to spoofing and repudiation attack.
• Spoofing: An attacker may impersonate a network engineer’s identity by spoofing
their IP address. The firewall or NSO’s northbound interface may have ACL rule
for incoming connections; however, if an attacker is able to bypass the access rule,
she can perform several attacks on the system. To mitigate this attack, the use of a
bi-directional authentication system is recommended. In NSO, user logs in through
CLI, SNMP, Web UI or via NETCONF protocol. In either case, the user needs to log
in using the login credentials or a public key in order to gain access. Once a user is
authenticated using AAA infrastructure, group membership is established for that
user and then all operations that can be performed by that user are authorized.
• Repudiation: An attacker or a trusted user may perform unauthorized requests and
may later deny doing so. To mitigate such attacks, the use of logging or auditing is
recommended. NSO comes with extensive logging functionality. All event logs in
the network can also be forwarded and saved in the Syslog server. Syslog logs using
NSO can be redirected to a local or a remote server.
Data Stores
NSO has a tree-structured database called as the configuration database (CDB). This
database stores a copy of all device-related configurations and is controlled by a YANG
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schema. From Table 5.3, a datastore is vulnerable to tampering, information disclosure
and denial of service attacks.
• Tampering: An attacker can modify or delete the data stored in CDB. By default,
CDB is stored under the path "$NCS_DIR/var/ncs/cdb". Location of CDB can be
separated from the NSO server to a server that denies all traffic by default and is
open only to specific locations or users that are allowed to make changes to it. To
mitigate this attack, firewall rules for the database server, ACLs and hardening of
the database server are recommended.
• Information Disclosure: CDB contains sensitive information related to the network
such as routing and network topology. This data is stored in XML format. Unau-
thorized access by an attacker can lead to a leak of sensitive information about the
network and can later be used for other planned attacks. To mitigate this risk, data
encryption techniques are recommended.
• Denial of Service: CDB datastore can be made unavailable using a denial of service
attack by an external malicious entity. Although NSO in a system install is imple-
mented in a high availability cluster, it is recommended to store the CDB data backup
on a separate location. CDB keeps its data in two files; A.cdb and C.cdb. If a datas-
tore is not available, a copy of these files could be used, and the copy is then used as
the full backup of CDB. To mitigate DoS attacks, additional measures such as packet
filtering, load balancers, and ACLs are recommended.
Data Flows
From the DFD in Figure 5.2, there are multiple data flows corresponding to the main
NSO process viz., the inbound flow of traffic from network engineer to NSO, the outbound
flow of output data from NSO to network engineer and the outbound flow of configuration
data from NSO to managed object, the CDB database and the public cloud hosted devices.
From Table 5.2, data flows are vulnerable to tampering, information disclosure and denial
of service attacks.
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Component Type Interaction S T R I D E
NSO * X * X X X
Managed Object X X X X X XProcesses
Public Cloud Hosted Devices X X X X X X
Interactors Network Engineer * *
Data Stores CDB Data Store X X X
Network Engineer to NSO * * X
NSO to Network Engineer * * -
NSO to Public Cloud Hosted Devices * * X
NSO to CDB Data Store * * X
Data Flows
NSO to Managed Object * * X
1 X Indicates mitigation exists by the suggested method.
2 * Indicates mitigation mechanism exists in the application architecture.
3 - Indicates the likeliness of this event does not affect the main process.
4 Blank indicates that the threat does not affect the component.
Table 5.4: Threat matrix of NETCONF and YANG based host management using NSO
• Tampering: Data flow across various interfaces may be tampered with by an attacker.
Data in transit between the network engineer and NSO can be tampered with by in-
jecting malicious information. However, NSO has an in-built SSH server. Therefore,
all NETCONF related data is sent over SSH. Data across southbound NETCONF in-
terface is protected using SSH as well.
• Information Disclosure: Data flow across various interfaces can be sniffed by an
attacker. As a countermeasure, the use of encryption is recommended. By default,
all XML related data in NETCONF are within an SSH session as an SSH subsystem.
• Denial of Service: Using a DoS attack, an attacker may interrupt data flow in either
direction, and the devices under attack would therefore not be able to provide the
intended services. The only exception being, if an attacker floods the data flow from
the NSO to the network engineer, then the network engineer system would crash;
however, from an attacker’s perspective, the likeliness of this event does not make
much sense. As a countermeasure, packet filtering firewalls, IP restriction, network
monitoring, clustering, and bandwidth control methods can be implemented.
Threat matrix Table 5.4 represents the summary of the security analysis.
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5.3 Security Insights
Even though Subsections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 cover the technical details of the security anal-
ysis, this section focuses on the insights derived from the analysis.
Threat modeling insight
This chapter comprised the threat modeling of two approaches for host management
using the STRIDE threat modeling technique. The analysis helped in finding out the po-
tential threats and based on component exposed to that threat, appropriate mitigations are
suggested using industry-wide recognized mitigation techniques.
The actual threats and the mitigation techniques may vary from enterprise to enter-
prise because the security and the threats rely on the design of the network. Besides, the
configuration management (CM) tools discussed in this thesis expose management API of
a network therefore care must be taken to ensure the security of the system. Any security
exploits in the application or an unauthorized access to the management API can break
down the whole network. Being a large technology company, Cisco and Red Hat have
already taken care of many security-related issues within the application architecture and
would continue to do so to provide on-going support to their customers. The security that
comes from additional security measures in the NETCONF-based management is preva-
lent because of secure transport and access control mechanism NACM mentioned under
Section 4.3.
Threat matrix threat count insight
As mentioned before, it is obvious that the total number of threats may vary a lot de-
pending on the components that are added to the DFD of the application. Keeping the
focus on the main process and the interactions related to it, the threat count is calculated
by taking the sum of the number of threats within each item in the legend of the threat
matrix table. In the threat matrix table legend, X represents the threats for which mitiga-








CM using Ansible 13 3 1
CM using NSO 11 14 1
Table 5.5: Threat matrix summary
under scrutiny. Based on the threat count of X and * for the main process and its related
components, threat matrix summary Table 5.5 is generated.
CM using Ansible has 13 threats and CM using NSO has 11 threats for which mitiga-
tions are suggested using appropriate measures. However, the actual number of threats
may vary from enterprise to enterprise due to its dependency on the design of the net-
work. Therefore, this information does not provide any tangible insight about the security
of the approach under inspection.
There is one threat in each approach, marked as N/A, which does not affect the main
process under scrutiny because of the fewer odds of the event.
Furthermore, CM using Ansible has 3 threats and CM using NSO has 14 threats for
which mitigation exists within the application itself. This information is indeed more im-
portant. A higher number of mitigation measures within the application indicates better
security. These threat mitigations are enforced by the in-built security measures in the ap-
plication. Whereas, mitigations for some threats in the CM using NSO approach also exist
because of the additional security measures available in the NETCONF protocol.
Attack surface insight
In the context of this research, an attack surface is the count of different threats, or
various attack vectors (paths), in a system that can be exploited by an attacker. The larger
the attack surface, the higher is the security risk. Therefore, to construct a secure system,
the goal is to minimize the attack surface as much as possible.
Host CM using legacy CM protocol SNMP has comparatively a larger attacker surface
as compared to the NETCONF and YANG based host CM using NSO. CM using SNMP
constitute for a larger attack surface because of its demerits such as unreliable transport
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service UDP and unencrypted transmission of configuration data in the initial versions
of the protocol. On the contrary, NETCONF and YANG based host CM using NSO and
ConfD constitute for a smaller attack surface because configuration related data is trans-
mitted over connection-oriented service TCP and communication paths are encrypted us-
ing SSH 5.3.
CM using SNMP: CM using NETCONF:
UDP TCP
SNMP Manager SNMP Agent NSO NETCONF Device
Unencrypted data Encrypted data
Figure 5.3: Attack surface
Simpler IT infrastructure security management insight
In most IT environments, network and security teams work in silos, which restricts the
horizontal communication between both the teams. NSO makes it possible for network
and security teams to work together to deliver the end-to-end network services. This could
be well understood by taking the example of implementing VPN services in an enterprise.
Once all the network and security devices are added to NSO, NSO provides a single ab-
straction layer for all the devices in the network using well-defined device YANG models.
A network engineer can use these YANG models to design and automatically change the
VPN service provisioning. Also, sensitive configurations such as VPN are automated us-
ing the transactional model discussed in Section 4.2. Any change to a VPN device is either
entirely implemented or entirely discarded. Therefore, there is a smaller chance of secu-
rity loopholes related to stray configurations in the network. Similarly, a YANG based
approach can also simplify the firewall rules and ACLs management of network and host
devices. This is harder to achieve using CLI based configuration management tools be-
cause of the lack of device abstraction.
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Finally, while consulting the security analysis from this thesis, a system designer, a
solution architect or an application designer may have different opinions about the design
of the DFDs and the populated threat matrices. However, different opinions, discussions,
and suggestions would only help in further strengthening the security.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
CLI, API, SNMP, and various other configuration management technologies have dom-
inated the configuration management of host systems for a very long time. This thesis
addresses the problems with these configuration management techniques and proposes a
NETCONF and YANG based host management solution that can overcome these issues.
The thesis also covers the security analysis of the two different approaches for host man-
agement. One is configuration and management using a configuration management tool
such as Ansible and the other being the presented NETCONF and YANG based manage-
ment solution using NSO and ConfD. The material in Section 4.4 shows the actual result
of using NSO/ConfD to set a single (non-networking) parameter on a Linux host. This
confirms that the approach is viable, and thus allowed us to proceed with the primary re-
sult of this thesis, which is the demonstration of the superior security of the NSO/ConfD
approach. The results of the security analysis, the listed solution capabilities, the security
efficiencies and with the advancements in automation and orchestration technologies, it
can be concluded that a NETCONF and YANG based host management solution is supe-
rior to the current legacy management solutions in many ways.
The proposed solution can be further extended and examined by doing a real-world
scalability and performance test and by adding support for additional YANG modules
and interfaces to encourage the use of NETCONF-YANG based host management in large
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enterprises. Since the tools used in this thesis are proprietary, therefore not much informa-
tion is available in the existing literature about their usefulness and application. The good
news is NETCONF is free to use in the basic version of ConfD, and that is why a NET-
CONF connection from NSO to Linux boxes was made feasible using ConfD as the middle
component. The thesis could be used as a starting point by someone who wants to use
NETCONF and YANG for host management using NSO and can develop the package in
ConfD as per their desired management requirements. The information in this thesis can
also be continuation work for a student interested in developing the package by utilizing
open-source YANG interfaces. Finally, all threat analysis results also need to be verified
using a thorough penetration testing as well as static and dynamic code analysis of the
native applications in use.
That being said, the transition of technology from a current environment to a new en-
vironment in an enterprise is laborious and distasteful. However, the transition can even-




A.1 Lab Machines Specifications
NSO and Ansible are installed on a dedicated Linux machine named Hartmanis run-
ning Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS version codename Xenial with 64-bit OS type on an Intel Core
i5-2400 CPU at 3.10GHz clock speed with 4GB of RAM and 242GB of HDD. The host ma-
chine model is HP Z210. It uses a dedicated PCI ethernet card for its connectivity to other
machines in the network.
Cisco CSR 1000V NETCONF router is installed on a dedicated Linux machine named
Gingko running Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS version codename Xenial with 64-bit OS type on an
Intel Core i5-2400 CPU at 3.10GHz clock speed with 6GB of RAM and 238 GB of HDD.
The host machine model is HP Z210. It has three dedicated PCI ethernet cards for its
connectivity to other machines in the network.
Cisco CSR 1000V SNMP router is installed on a dedicated Linux machine named Tar-
jan running Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS version codename Xenial with 64-bit OS type on an Intel
Core i5-2400 CPU at 3.10GHz clock speed with 6GB of RAM and 242GB of HDD. The host
machine model is HP Z210. It has three dedicated PCI ethernet cards for its connectivity
to other machines in the network.
Rest of the machines have relatively similar OS configurations as the machines above.
Backus, Iversion, Ritchie, Minsky, and Dijkstra has an Intel Core 2-6300 CPU at 1.86GHz
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clock speed with 2GB of RAM and 155GB of HDD. The host machine model on these
machines is Dell 390. Cocke is a Dell T3400 machine with an Intel Core 2 Duo-E6750 CPU
at 2.66GHz clock speed with 2GB of RAM and 155GB of HDD. McCarthy is a Dell T3400
machine with an Intel Core 2 Duo-E7400 CPU at 2.80GHz clock speed with 2GB of RAM
and 244GB of HDD.
Cisco CSR 1000V routers are installed on Ubuntu machines using the .iso file on a
KVM hypervisor. Installation process requires manually creating the VM on the hypervi-
sor. ConfD is installed and setup on Iversion.
A.2 Installing KVM
To check if the processor supports hardware virtualization:
$ egrep -c ’(vmx|svm)’ /proc/cpuinfo
Output value 0 means that the CPU does not support hardware virtualization.
Output value 1 or more means the processor does support virtualization, but it still
needs to be ensured that the virtualization is enabled in the BIOS.
Alternatively, we can execute:
$ kvm-ok
This would return the following output:
INFO: /dev/kvm exists
KVM acceleration can be used
A.2.1 Dependencies
The command below will make sure that all the dependencies are installed that are
required for the functioning of KVM. Different packages will serve different purposes such
as administering QEMU and KVM instances, building virtual machines, and creating a
bridge from the network to the VMs.
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$ sudo apt-get install qemu-kvm libvirt-bin ubuntu-vm-builder
↪→ bridge-utils
A.2.2 Adding user to libvirtd group
$ sudo adduser vijay libvirtd
Adding user ’vijay’ to group ’libvirtd’ ...
The user needs to login again for them to become a member of libvirtd group. The
member of this group can on run virtual machines.
A.2.3 Verifying installation




The output would be empty since at this point no VM has been added.
A.2.4 Installing GUI
$ sudo apt-get install virt-manager
virt-manager is the GUI tool that will be used subsequently to add and manage the
virtual machines.
A.2.5 Autostarting VM on startup
$ virsh autostart CSR1000v-Netconf
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Once the VM has been created (explained later), it can be configured so that it starts
automatically with the system reboot.
Next, the following steps are performed on the KVM server:
A.2.6 Creating the Cisco CSR 1000V VM
Installing Cisco CSR 1000V routers .iso files using virt-manager is a straightforward
process. Installation requirements and a step-by-step guide on the installation process
is given in the "Cisco CSR 1000V Series Cloud Services Router Software Configuration
Guide" that ships with the package file.
A.2.7 Booting the Cisco CSR 1000V VM
By default, the Cisco CSR 1000V router is accessed using the virtual VGA console.
Alternatively, the VMs can also be configured to use the Serial console port. Configuring a
serial console port would allow access to the router using a Telnet or SSH connection from
any other machine in the lab. Following command can be used to Telnet to the VM:
$ telnet host-ip portnumber
For the console access to work through the serial port, the router must be configured


















Similarly, the other router is setup and configured with the hostname CSR1000v-SNMP.
A.3 Installing NSO
Cisco’s NSO (NSO, n.d.) supports Linux and Mac OS X platforms. The installer file
is distributed by the OS name Linux and Darwin respectively. Installation steps are per-
formed on the Ubuntu platform; a Linux distribution based on Debian. The package can
be installed in the following two ways:
• Local installation – used in lab environment for evaluation, proof of concept and
development of the product.
• System installation – used for deployment of the product in production environment.
NSO installation file archive has the following naming pattern:
nso-VERSION.OS.ARCH.installer.bin
The variables in the file name define the version, OS and the CPU architecture.
A.3.1 Dependencies
Additional packages are required that will serve different purposes such as building
NSO examples, using NETCONF console, etc.
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$ sudo apt-get install default-jdk
$ sudo apt-get install ant
$ sudo apt-get install python-paramiko
Verifying the installation of dependencies:
$ java -version
$ ant -version
Web UI can be accessed through Firefox browser installed on Ubuntu by visiting the
following URL: http://127.0.0.1:8080/login.html
A.3.2 NSO Local Install
Installation file used is nso-4.1.linux.x86_64.installer.bin. Add-ons are tested on a newer
version nso-4.7.linux.x86_64.installer.bin.
(a) NSO is installed in a single directory (i.e. $HOME in this case), under folder name
ncs-4.1, using attribute value –local-install:
$ sh nso-4.1.linux.x86_64.installer.bin $HOME/ncs-4.1 --local
↪→ -install
Installation notes generated from the above command are as following:
INFO Using temporary directory /tmp/ncs_installer.15038 to
↪→ stage NCS installation bundle
INFO Unpacked ncs-4.1 in /home/vijay/ncs-4.1
INFO Found and unpacked corresponding DOCUMENTATION_PACKAGE
INFO Found and unpacked corresponding EXAMPLE_PACKAGE
INFO Generating default SSH hostkey (this may take some time
↪→ )
INFO SSH hostkey generated
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INFO Environment set-up generated in /home/vijay/ncs-4.1/
↪→ ncsrc
INFO NCS installation script finished
INFO Found and unpacked corresponding NETSIM_PACKAGE
INFO NCS installation complete
(b) Installation program creates a shell script file named ncsrc (under $HOME/ncs-4.1/).
This file need to be executed using source command to set the environment variables
into the current shell script:
$ source $HOME/ncs-4.1/ncsrc
To check the environment variable populated after running the above command:
$ echo $NCS_DIR
This would return /home/vijay/ncs-4.1; the installation directory of NSO.
(c) Verifying the NSO status:
$ ncs --status | grep status
$ ncs --version
(d) Creating a run-time directory where NSO would store its database and log files:
$ ncs-setup --dest $HOME/ncs-run
(e) Starting NSO daemon under the run-time directory:
$ cd $HOME/ncs-run
$ ncs
NSO daemon need not be run at this point as there are no real or simulated devices
that have been added or created so far. It will be followed in the subsequent installation
steps.
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A.3.3 Setting up a simulated network of devices using Netsim
NSO comes pre-loaded with a network simulator called Netsim. Netsim provides the
capability within NSO to create dummy devices that run-in localhost using NEDs. It also
creates a management plane for the devices without exposing any control plane or data
plane. Netsim devices give a fair indication of how the configurations would behave on
the real devices.
In the lab, example packages that come with NSO installation bundle are used to
demonstrate how a set of simulated network of Cisco IOS, Juniper Junos and a Netconf
device (using its YANG file) can be created and added using Netsim. Subsequently, real
devices are added using a system build NED and the NEDs in $NCS_DIR/packages/neds/
directory.
Creating Netsim devices and running the simulator:
Very first step before running any example is to make sure to source the ncsrc file in
$NCS_DIR:
$ source $HOME/ncs-4.1/ncsrc
Then go to the following directory:
$NCS_DIR/examples.ncs/getting-started/using-ncs/1-simulated-cisco-ios/
(a) Generate a network simulator with 3 devices c0, c1, c2. They all speak Cisco CLI:





(b) Start the simulated devices:
$ ncs-netsim start
DEVICE c0 OK STARTED
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DEVICE c1 OK STARTED
DEVICE c2 OK STARTED
(c) Run the CLI towards one of the simulated devices:
$ ncs-netsim cli-i c0
(Above command opens a Cisco IOS style CLI for device c0.)
c0> enable
c0# show running-config
(Above command shows that the device has some initial config.)




Structural device configurations are stored in the following file:
$NCS_DIR/examples.ncs/getting-started-using-ncs/1-simulated-cisco-ios/netsim/c/c0/cdb/ios.xml.
A.3.4 Setting up and starting NSO
Go to directory $NCS_DIR/examples.ncs/getting-started/using-ncs/1-simulated-cisco-ios
Create NSO environment ready to run towards the simulated devices using ncs-setup
command:
$ ncs-setup --netsim-dir ./netsim --dest .
Above command creates the run-time directories needed by NSO, links the NED pack-




Start the NSO CLI as user admin with a Cisco style CLI:
$ ncs_cli -C -u admin
admin@ncs#
NSO also supports a Juniper style CLI, that is started by using a -J modification to the
command as follows:
$ ncs_cli -J -u admin
admin@ncs>
To switch between Cisco IOS and Juniper style CLI:
admin@ncs> switch cli
A.3.5 Adding Netsim devices to NSO
Go to the directory where Netsim devices were created and execute the following com-
mands:
$ ncs-netsim list
$ ncs_cli -C -u admin
admin@ncs# config
admin@ncs(config)# devices device c0 address 127.0.0.1 port 10022
↪→ device-type cli
admin@ncs(config-device-c0)# authgroup default







A.3.6 Setting up run-time directory and loading NED packages for adding real
devices to NSO
Create a new directory (let’s say under $HOME) and execute the following commands:
$ mkdir nso-data
$ ncs-setup --dest nso-data
$ cd nso-data
$ ncs
Under ∼/nso-data/packages, create a symlink for packages from ncs-4.1 directory:
$ ln -s ~/ncs-4.1/packages/neds/cisco-ios cisco-ios
Similarly, create symlinks for all the packages that will be used in the lab setup. Reload
the packages once symlink has been created:
~/nso-data/packages$ ncs_cli -C -u admin
admin@ncs# packages reload
A.3.7 Initial configuration of real NETCONF device
Virtual router CSR1000v-NETCONF is configured using the following initial configu-
ration:
Enabling SSH connectivity on the router:
~/nso-data/packages$ ncs_cli -C -u admin
CSR1000v-NETCONF#conf t
CSR1000v-NETCONF(config)#ip domain-name concordia.ca
CSR1000v-NETCONF(config)#crypto key generate rsa
2048
CSR1000v-NETCONF(config)#username admin priv 15 password 15
CSR1000v-NETCONF(config)#enable password admin
















To check the status of the software processes required to support NETCONF-YANG:










Check for NETCONF-SSH connectivity to the router:
vijay@Gingko:~$ ssh -s admin@192.168.122.182 -p 830 netconf
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A successful connection to the device will return the list of capabilities supported by
the device.
Note – if connection fails, then go to device and remove the aaa new-model config or,










Sending hello message to the device to inform the device that you are a NETCONF
client:
NSO comes with netconf-console tool that can be used for testing NETCONF operations.
In the example below, an explicit device username, password, and the NETCONF port is
specified with the hello command to connect to the device and print its capabilities:
$ netconf-console --host=192.168.122.182 -u admin -p admin --port
↪→ 830 --hello







































Similarly, other NETCONF operations can be performed.
A.3.8 Adding real NETCONF device using Pioneer
Pioneer is an add-on that can be used to perform NETCONF operations on a NET-
CONF supported device. It also allows to build a custom NETCONF NED for the device
using its YANG data models.
Install following additional dependencies:
$ sudo apt install python-pip
$ pip install paramiko
$ sudo apt-get install xsltproc
To check if all the dependencies are fulfilled:
$ which ncs && which python && python -c "import paramiko" \
&& which xsltproc && which xmllint && which bash && which pyang \
&& echo "All Fine"
Downloading, installing and building the NSO Pioneer package:
$ cd packages
$ git clone https://github.com/NSO-developer/pioneer






$ ncs_cli -C -u admin
admin connected from 132.205.2.217 using ssh on Hartmanis
admin@ncs# packages reload
>>> System upgrade is starting.
>>> Sessions in configure mode must exit to operational mode.
>>> No configuration changes can be performed until upgrade has
↪→ completed.







admin@ncs(config)# devices authgroups group thesis-project




Adding an IOS device using built-in Cisco IOS NED:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device CSR1000v address 132.205.9.49
↪→ authgroup thesis-project device-type cli ned-id cisco-ios







admin@ncs# show devices device CSR1000v
The device has now been added to NSO using the built-in Cisco IOS NED that ships
with the NSO installation package. This NED doesn’t support NETCONF operations. Pi-
oneer is used to build the NETCONF NED using the device YANG models.
Creating a device list entry for the NETCONF device, committing the changes and
connecting to the device:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device CSR1000v-NETCONF address
↪→ 132.205.9.49 port 830 authgroup thesis-project device-type








At this point, any attempt to sync-from will fail since no NETCONF NED has been build
for the device yet.
Testing pioneer NETCONF hello:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device CSR1000v-NETCONF pioneer
↪→ netconf hello
This will return a hello response.
Fetching YANG models list from the device:
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admin@ncs(config)# devices device CSR1000v-NETCONF pioneer yang
↪→ fetch-list
admin@ncs(config)# devices device CSR1000v-NETCONF pioneer yang
↪→ download
This will return a list of YANG files supported by the device. If the fetch-list doesn’t
work, YANG models need to be retrieved manually from the device owner.
Building NETCONF NED:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device CSR1000v-NETCONF pioneer yang
↪→ build-netconf-ned
Installing NETCONF NED:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device CSR1000v-NETCONF pioneer yang
↪→ install-netconf-ned
Reloading packages to use the package in NSO:
admin@ncs# packages reload
Checking sync-from:





While building a NETCONF NED, it is possible that some YANG files might already
be in NSO, or some may return an error. If so, NSO will return a circular dependency error.
It can be fixed by disabling the broken YANG types and then building the NED again.
Currently, there is no built-in method in NSO to build the NED for a device. Future
versions of NSO, 4.8 onwards, will supposedly have a built-in NETCONF NED builder
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through which it will be possible to generate, build and load YANG-based NETCONF
NEDs automatically. It will significantly reduce the number of manual steps to onboard
the devices to NSO.
A.3.9 Adding real SNMP device to NSO
To manage an SNMP device, its data models should be imported into NSO. These
data models are defined in MIBs. NSO uses these data models to generate configuration
commands. These data models are converted to YANG data models and the YANG data
models are then compiled to build the NED.
Also, to onboard the device to KVM, it is obvious to apply the initial configuration sim-
ilar to NETCONF device, with some additional configurations specific to SNMP devices.
Configuring SNMP v3 on a Cisco CSR 1000V router:
CSR1000v-SNMP#conf t
CSR1000v-SNMP(config)#snmp-server group G1 v3 priv
CSR1000v-SNMP(config)#snmp-server user U1 G1 v3 auth sha snmpapwd












Using ncs-make-package command to create an SNMP NED package:
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ncs-make-package command can be used to create a NED package for a device using its
MIB files. MIB for a device can be downloaded from Cisco’s online MIB Locator utility. A
list of MIBs translated to its equivalent YANG data models can also be downloaded from
the online YangModels Git repository.
Once MIBs are retrieved, following commands can then be used to create a package for
the device:
$ ncs-make-package --snmp-ned ~/Downloads/snmpmib/ snmpned
$ cd snmpned/src; make
The above command takes attribute value –snmp-ned for building an SNMP package
(or, attribute value –netconf-ned for building a NETCONF package) and creates a package
named snmpned assuming its MIB files are under the folder snmpmib.
The generated package tells NSO about the MIBs the device implements and can also
be used to simulate Netsim devices. Once the package has been built, it is loaded into NSO,
and the SNMP device is then added using the same procedure just like any other device.
We can also use the example NED package that ships with NSO with built-in SNMP NED
component. The package is available under the directory $NCS_DIR/examples.ncs/snmp-
ned/.
A.4 Installing Ansible
Ansible (Ansible, n.d.) is a standalone application installed on a server and does not
require an Ansible agent running on client machines. The only requirement is Python and
SSH installed and enabled on the client machines that need to be configured via Ansible.
A.4.1 Dependencies
Install the following package and add the ppa repository on the Ansible server ma-
chine:
$ sudo apt-get install software-properties-common
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$ sudo apt-get update
$ sudo apt-add-repository ppa:ansible/ansible
A.4.2 Installing Ansible package
To install Ansible:
$ sudo apt-get install ansible
To check the version installed:
$ ansible --version
ansible 2.6.3
config file = /etc/ansible/ansible.cfg
configured module search path = [u’/home/vijay/.ansible/plugins
↪→ /modules’, u’/usr/share/ansible/plugins/modules’]
ansible python module location = /usr/lib/python2.7/dist-
↪→ packages/ansible
executable location = /usr/bin/ansible
python version = 2.7.12 (default, Dec 4 2017, 14:50:18) [GCC
↪→ 5.4.0 20160609]
A.4.3 Onboarding client machines
Although the client that needs to be configured using Ansible does not require to have
any specific package installed, there needs to be a couple of things that need to be checked.
e.g.:
• SSH keypairs: required to connect to the client machines without the need to login
manually everytime a configuration is pushed. Ansible server has the private key
installed on it, whereas the client machines have the server’s public key.
• sudo: to configure the root file systems (escalate privilege).
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• Static addressing: Ansible server can have a DHCP assigned address as the config-
uration commands will initiate from this machine and nothing connects to it. Client
machines could have DNS hostname or DHCP assigned address as well, but static
addressing is the most reliable way to configure client machines using Ansible.
All the machines in the lab environment have a static IP address. The IP address of
these machines are added to hosts file on Ansible server to connect using hostnames:
$ sudo nano /etc/hosts










A.4.4 Generating SSH keys
SSH keypair is generated using ssh-keygen command:
$ ssh-keygen





Assuming both the server and the client machines have the same username (in this case
vijay), transfer the public key to the client machines. It is important to note that a private
key is never sent to any other computer or user.
$ ssh-copy-id -i .ssh/id_rsa.pub Backus
/usr/bin/ssh-copy-id: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: ".
↪→ ssh/id_rsa.pub"
/usr/bin/ssh-copy-id: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key
↪→ (s), to filter out any that are already installed
/usr/bin/ssh-copy-id: INFO: 1 key(s) remain to be installed -- if
↪→ you are prompted now it is to install the new keys
vijay@backus’s password:
Number of key(s) added: 1
Now try logging into the machine, with: "ssh ’Backus’"
and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added
↪→ .
Similarly, keys are copied to the other machines that need to be managed and config-
ured using Ansible server.
While copying the public key, explicitly define the username if the client’s machine has
a different username than the Ansible server:
$ ssh-copy-id -i .ssh/id_rsa.pub dev@Backus
To bypass the sudo login everytime sudo is used (privileged access), go to the client
machine’s visudo to edit the /etc/sudoers file:
$ sudo visudo
Add the following line to the bottom of sudoers file and save:
vijay ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
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A.4.5 Adding device groups
Next, add device groups so that the configurations can be fetched and sent to multiple
devices using group name instead of sending it to individual devices:
$ sudo nano /etc/ansible/hosts














A.4.6 Checking connectivity from Ansible server to client machines
Client machines can now be pinged from Ansible server. If the ping response is SUC-
CESS, it means client machines are ready to be configured using Ansible server:
$ ansible -m ping all






































A.5 Integrating Ansible and NSO
The built-in northbound REST API in NSO can be used to fetch the device related
data by using the curl command. The command can be modified to retrieve data in the
JSON format. The data retrieved can then be converted into YAML code. This YAML
code is used in creating Ansible playbooks to perform various actions on the devices using
Ansible NSO modules.
The curl command below fetches the information of the device named c0 from the NSO
configuration database (CDB). The output of this command can be copied and parsed into
YAML format using an online json2yaml utility.
$ curl -s -u admin:admin -H "Accept: application/vnd.yang.data+
↪→ json" http://localhost:8080/api/config/devices/device/c0/
↪→ config?deep









































Playbook test run showing the tasks in action and the device change state:
$ ansible-playbook -v nsoansible.yaml
Using /etc/ansible/ansible.cfg as config file





TASK [Sync from devices]
*******************************************************
changed: [127.0.0.1] => {"changed": true, "output": {"sync-result
": [{"device": "c0", "result": "true"}, {"device": "c1", "
result": "true"}, {"device": "c2", "result": "true"}]}}
TASK [Query device name and device type]
*******************************************************
ok: [127.0.0.1] => {"changed": false, "output": [["c0", "ios-id:
cisco-iosssh"], ["c1", "ios-id:cisco-iosssh"], ["c2", "ios-id:
cisco-iosssh"]]}
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TASK [Apply device configuration]
*******************************************************
changed: [127.0.0.1] => {"changed": true, "changes": [{"from":
null, "path": "/ncs:devices/device{c0}/config/ios:interface/
FastEthernet{1/0}/ip/address/primary/address", "to": "
10.0.0.10", "type": "set"}, {"from": null, "path": "/ncs:
devices/device{c0}/config/ios:interface/FastEthernet{1/0}/ip/




127.0.0.1 : ok=4 changed=2 unreachable=0
failed=0
A.6 Installing ConfD
Just like NSO, ConfD (ConfD, n.d.) installation file is also a self-extract archive which is
OS/CPU specific. The distribution file used in lab environment is confd-basic-6.6.linux.x86_64.
To install and unpack the archive file, execute the following command and specify the in-
stallation directory as an argument in this command:
$ sh confd-basic-6.6.linux.x86_64.installer.bin ~/confd-6.6
Installation notes generated by executing the above command are as follows:
INFO Unpacked confd-basic-6.6 in /home/vijay/confd-6.6
INFO Found and unpacked corresponding DOCUMENTATION_PACKAGE
INFO Found and unpacked corresponding EXAMPLE_PACKAGE
INFO Generating default SSH hostkey (this may take some time)
INFO SSH hostkey generated
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INFO Environment set-up generated in /home/vijay/confd-6.6/
↪→ confdrc
INFO ConfD installation script finished
Installation program creates a shell script file named confdrc (under $HOME/confd-6.6/).
The file needs to be executed using the source command to set the environment variables
into the current shell script:
$ source $HOME/confd-6.6/confdrc
To check the environment variable populated after running the above command:
$ echo $CONFD_DIR
This should return /home/vijay/confd-6.6; the installation directory of ConfD.
Next step is to install LinuxCfg. LinuxCfg is a tool that is included with ConfD and
can be used to manage a set of objects for a Linux OS using their YANG data models. It
has an inbuilt component that handles the interaction with ConfD and a set of individual
components that handle the management of the objects using their data model defined in
YANG.
A.6.1 Requirements for LinuxCfg
Building the package requires:
• GNU make C compiler
• ConfD version 6.3.1 or higher (YANG 1.1 is required by some components)
A.6.2 Building and Installing LinuxCfg
Go to $CONFD_DIR/examples.confd/linuxcfg directory. On the top level of this directory,
there is a makefile with instructions to build and install the components. This file can be
modified to add or remove any components that need to be installed.










Note: root privileges might be required to run LinuxCfg.
Or, simply start using the make file:
$ make start
To start ConfD CLI:
$ make cli
To enter config mode in the ConfD prompt:
admin connected from 132.205.2.209 using ssh on Iversion
Iversion# config
Entering configuration mode terminal
Iversion(config)#
To test components connectivity, execute system-restart command from ConfD terminal





Similarly, ietf_interface and ietf_routing component can be tested to perform various op-
erations such as modify network settings, configure IP routes, etc.
Iversion(config)# interfaces interface
Possible completions:
enp4s0 enp5s4 enp5s5 lo range virbr0 virbr0-nic
To stop the LinuxCfg daemon:
$ make stop
To stop the ConfD daemon:
$ confd --stop
A.7 Integrating ConfD and NSO
Once NSO and ConfD have been setup correctly, it is relatively a trivial task to inte-
grate both the tools. Both NSO and ConfD support NETCONF on the northbound and the
southbound. This capability can be leveraged to access ConfD’s northbound NETCONF
interface using NSO’s southbound NETCONF interface. In order to achieve this, a NED
needs to be build using NSO Pioneer package. This NED enables a NETCONF interface
between NSO and the NETCONF enabled ConfD managed object.
To access the northbound interface on ConfD device, make sure that NETCONF is en-
abled in the confd.conf file under the directory: $CONFD_DIR/etc/confd/



















Creating an authgroup for the ConfD based Linux device:
admin@ncs# config
admin@ncs(config)# devices authgroups group confd default-map
↪→ remote-name vijay remote-password <password>
admin@ncs(config-group-confd)# commit
Adding the Linux device to NSO:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device LinuxDevice address
↪→ 132.205.9.54 authgroup confd port 2022 device-type netconf





Fetching YANG models list from the device:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device LinuxDevice pioneer yang fetch-
↪→ list
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admin@ncs(config)# devices device LinuxDevice pioneer yang
↪→ download
Building the NED using retrieved YANG models:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device LinuxDevice pioneer yang build-
↪→ netconf-ned
Installing the NETCONF NED:
admin@ncs(config)# devices device LinuxDevice pioneer yang
↪→ install-netconf-ned
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